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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)(Supp. 1989), by virtue of the Order of the 
Supreme Court, dated February 22, 1989, pouring-over this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Aetna has identified the issues it has chosen to appeal at 
pages 3-4 of its Brief. Home has briefed the issues raised by 
Aetna (see Argument, supra). At this point, Home notes only 
that it does not necessarily accept the categorization scheme 
offered by Aetna, in terms of what the effect would be of a 
resolution of any of the issues in Aetna's favor. Home's 
analysis in this regard is subsumed within the Argument which 
follows. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Aetna identifies former Utah Code Ann. § 31-19-8 (since 
repealed) as one "whose interpretation is determinative." As 
Home notes in point III herein, this statute need not be 
addressed at all to affirm the Court's handling of jury special 
interrogatories nos. 2 and 4. Also, Home and Aetna disagree on 
whether the statute applies where there was no 
tfcisrepreservtatiorv or oavLssiotv of a material fact by Rofl\e, 
intentional or unintentional, in response to any inquiry in the 
Application it completed for the Aetna Bond. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case. 
This is an action on a contract of insurance brought by 
Home Savings & Loan against the Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Company. By this action# Home seeks indemnification for losses 
caused by the dishonest conduct of one of its employees, Larry 
Glad# which it sustained and discovered during the period a 
Savings & Loan Blanket Bond issued by Aetna was in effect. 
Home also seeks indemnification for attorneys fees incurred by 
it in defending the lawsuit which gave rise to the losses it 
sustained. 
Home sustained its losses when the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah, in Armitaae v. Home Savings & 
Loan, Civil No. C82-0670K (Kane, J.) voided the notes and trust 
deeds of 36 husband and wife borrowers who had borrowed money 
from Home to invest in AFCO/ a Utah corporate enterprise headed 
by Grant Affleck. The Armitaae jury returned a verdict adverse 
to Home Savings on August 14, 1984. Based on the verdict/ the 
Armitaae Court on February 24/ 1986 entered judgment formally 
voiding the plaintiffs' notes and trust deeds. The principal 
on the 36 notes voided by the Armitaae Court totaled 
approximately $1.2 million/ which/ after certain setoffs 
ordered by the Court/ resulted in a loss to Home of 
approximately $998/000. In addition, the Court ordered Home to 
pay the Armitage plaintiffs $381/294.62 in attorneys fees and 
- 2 -
costs they had incurred, which sum was later compromised in 
settlement to $190,647.31. 
II. Procedural History and Trial Court Disposition, 
Home Savings filed its complaint against Aetna in March, 
1986. The case was tried to a jury over a five-week period in 
October - November 1987, which culminated in the jury, on 
November 24, 1987, issuing a Special Verdict and responding to 
certain separate Special Interrogatories. In a series of 
hearings over the next twelve months, the Court ruled on the 
effect of the jury's response to special interrogatories and 
resolved various issues which the parties had reserved for 
determination by the Court. Judgment was finally entered in 
favor of Home on November 2, 1988, in the amount of 
$1,983,756.12. 
In the months preceding trial, Aetna brought several 
motions seeking dismissal of Home's complaint. The first was a 
motion to dismiss for failure to join an allegedly 
indispensable party, F&D of Maryland, which had issued fidelity 
Bond coverage to Home prior to Home's purchase of the Aetna 
Bond in June, 1982. Aetna appeals from the denial of that 
motion. (Aetna Brief, Point VI). 
Next, Aetna tried three motions for summary judgment. 
Aetna argued that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of 
- 3 -
law because: (1) its Bond did not indemnify Home's loss 
because Home, allegedly, had somehow discovered its "loss" 
before the Aetna Bond went into effect on June 21, 1982 (though 
the Armitage judgment would not be entered until 3-1/2 years 
later); (2) its Bond excluded from coverage "any loss resulting 
directly or indirectly from trading" (Rider 6030a); and (3) 
Home allegedly failed to mitigate its damages, Aetna appeals 
the Trial Court's denial of its first and second motions for 
summary judgment, (Aetna Brief, Points II and IV). 
At the same time Aetna moved for summary judgment, Home 
sought a determination that, consistent with the 
indemnification language in Aetna's Bond, Home both "sustained" 
and "discovered" its loss on the AFCO-investor loans during the 
time period the Aetna Bond was in effect. The Trial Court 
issued an Order construing the Bond, in which it concluded that 
Home's "loss" was sustained and discovered when the Armitaae 
Court avoided the AFCO-investors' notes and trust deeds (R. 
385). The Order thus established that Home "discovered its 
'loss sustained' during the period the Aetna Bond was in 
effect." The Order, however, left two key factual questions 
for the jury to decide: (1) "Was Larry Glad's conduct 
dishonest?" and (2) "If Glad's conduct was dishonest, did it 
cause Home to sustain its losses on the AFCO-investor loans?" 
- 4 -
By the time of trial, Aetna had abandoned its "trading 
exclusion" defense. (See Pretrial Order, R. 719). Aetna 
defended on several remaining bases. Principally/ it argued: 
(1) that Home had not proven that Glad was dishonest; (2) that 
Home's losses were caused not by Larry Glad/ but were caused by 
Home's mismanagement and bad business judgment; (3) that Home 
had failed to mitigate its losses; (4) that Home had failed to 
timely notify Aetna of a loss or potential loss caused by 
dishonesty, in accordance with the Bond's notice provisions; 
(5) that coverage for loss caused by Glad's dishonest conduct 
was excluded by Section 11 of its Bond/ which terminates 
coverage for loss caused by an employee who continues in the 
insured's employment after the insured discovers he is 
dishonest (Aetna Brief/ Point I); and (6) its Bond was void ab 
initio because Home had either intentionally or unintentionally 
failed to disclose to Aetna facts and information material to 
the risk it insured/ in connection with the Application Home 
completed when it purchased the Bond (Aetna Brief/ Point III). 
At trial/ Aetna's "everything including the kitchen sink" 
defense not infrequently witnessed Aetna arguing intrinsically 
contradictory positions. Closing argument/ for instance, found 
Aetna defending Larry Glad's integrity and arguing that Home 
had not proven he was dishonest (R. 2917.150-.180/ -.196-.197); 
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while simultaneously urging that the evidence of Glad's 
dishonesty was so pervasive that Home should have known better 
than to have hired him in the first place (R. 2917,213-.215). 
It found Aetna contending that Glad had been the only one at 
Home Savings "trying to do the right thing" (R. 2917.152,-.153, 
-.154); even though it was Aetna which called Ron Carnago, who 
testified that Glad had earlier embezzled $60,000 from Sandy 
State Bank while in its employ (R. 2910.197-.224; Trial Exh. 
366), and Sandy State's Clea Rasmussen, who branded Glad "an 
habitual liar," though a "very" good and "convincing" one. (R. 
2923.18). 
Because Aetna failed to prove any prejudice, the Trial 
Court disposed of Aetna's "timely notice" issue in the process 
of instructing the jury. (R. 2923.218-.220; Instruction no. 
35, R. 1337). Aetna has not appealed the Court's ruling on 
"notice." Aetna has, however, appealed the Court's decision to 
give certain other instructions, as well as its refusal to give 
two instructions which Aetna proposed. (Aetna Brief, Point V). 
The Trial Court submitted to the jury a Special Verdict. 
(R. 1347). It also drafted and separately submitted Special 
Interrogatories, keyed to Aetna's equitable "Bond void ab 
initio" defense and its "Section 11" defense (R. 1351), the 
responses to which the Court indicated would be evaluated and 
"sorted through" following trial. On Thanksgiving eve, 1987, 
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the jury returned its Special Verdict and answered the Special 
Interrogatories. The jury, in its Special Verdict, found (1) 
that Glad's conduct, while in Home's employment, was dishonest 
and (2) that Glad's dishonest conduct had caused certain of the 
losses Home had sustained in connection with the AFCO-investor 
loans. It then found that Home's losses on 34 of the 36 
AFCO-investor loans had been caused by Glad's dishonest 
conduct. It also found that Home had not failed to mitigate 
its losses. 
Responding to Special Interrogatories nos. 1-4, the jury 
concluded there was no intentional omission or nondisclosure by 
Home of information material to the risk Aetna had insured, in 
response to inquiries made by Aetna in the Application for the 
Bond which Home completed, or otherwise. However, the jury 
advised the Trial Court that Home had unintentionally failed to 
diclose material information in response to, and aside from, 
inquiries made by Aetna in the Application. The jury's answers 
to the final four interrogatories established that someone at 
Home had discovered an act of dishonesty by Larry Glad "about 
mid-December 1981", unrelated to the AFCO-investor loans; and 
that Home had not known that Glad had engaged in dishonest 
conduct at other institutions prior to the time Home hired him. 
Aetna brought the first in a series of post-trial motions, 
entitled "motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict." In 
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it/ Aetna again contended that there was no evidence at trial 
which established that Glad was dishonest and there was no 
evidence that Glad's dishonest conduct caused Home's losses. 
The Court denied Aetna's motion/ finding that there was 
substantial evidence in the record to support the jury's 
verdict. (R. 1498/ 2918.48-.49). 
The Trial Court and the parties next proceeded to examine 
the impact of the jury's special interrogatory responses on the 
special verdict. In a lengthy Memorandum Decision issued March 
4/ 1988 (R. 2058)/ the Court found no evidence in the record to 
support the jury's conclusion that Home had unintentionally 
failed to disclose information material- to the risk, in 
response to any inquiries made by Aetna in the Application it 
asked Home to complete. Accordingly/ the Court chose to 
disregard the jury's answer to interrogatory no. 2. The Court 
found that evidence existed in the record to support the jury's 
answer to interrogatory no. 4, but concluded that an insured 
has no legal duty to volunteer facts or information about which 
an insurer makes no inquiry. The Court also concluded that the 
jury's responses to interrogatories nos. 5-8 provided no basis 
for denying coverage for Home's losses. The Court ruled that 
judgment would be entered in Home's favor/ pending resolution 
of remaining issues that the parties had reserved for 
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determination by the Court, which would establish the amount of 
the judgment. 
All but one of the remaining issues were resolved by Minute 
Entries of April 11 and May 10, 1988 (R. 2212, 2397). Aetna 
appeals two of the issues resolved by the second Minute Entry: 
(1) Home's claim for the attorneys fees it paid to the Armitage 
plaintiffs (Aetna Brief, Point VIII-A); and (2) Aetna's claim, 
first raised after trial, that Home's "profits" on the AFCO and 
AFCO-investor loans should be set off against its losses (Aetna 
Brief, Point VII). 
The remaining issue was Home's claim of indemnification for 
fees and costs it paid to its attorneys in defending the 
Armitage litigation. Following a short period which the Court 
allowed for supplemental discovery into "reasonableness" of 
fees, Home, in October, 1988, moved for partial summary 
judgment on the fees issue. Home sought the full $474,170.57 
it paid in fees. Rather than contest Home's Motion, Aetna 
stipulated that the reasonable fees to which Home was entitled 
were $437,500.00. Despite its Stipulation to the contrary, 
Aetna now appeals this issue as well. (Aetna Brief, Point 
VIII-B). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I. Home's acquisition of the Aetna Bond. 
1. Federal and State regulatory law in effect during the 
time period of this lawsuit required Home to have in place 
fidelity loss coverage, in the form of a standard Savings & 
Loan Blanket Bond. (Shaw, R. 2916*204; Bradshaw, R. 
2906.16-.22) . 
2. From June 21, 1979 to June 21, 1982, Home was 
protected against loss caused by dishonesty of any of its 
employees by a Form 22 Savings & Loan Blanket Bond issued by 
F&D of Maryland. (R. 3414-3432). 
3. In mid-May, 1982, Don Bradshaw, in an effort to 
solicit Home's business, wrote Home and asked if he could quote 
Home a rate on a Blanket Bond, to be issued by The Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Co. (Trial Exh. 117; R. 2906.6-.il). 
Bradshaw was an independent insurance agent with authority to 
sell insurance on behalf of Aetna, F&D of Maryland, and various 
other companies. (R. 2906.1-.4). Bradshaw was aware that the 
F&D Bond's anniversary date was June 21, 1982 (R. 2906.7) and 
that Home could automatically renew the F&D Bond (R. 2906.23). 
4. Bradshaw had authority to write a renewal of the F&D 
Bond. (R. 2906.11-.12). However, he recommended that Home 
switch its Bond coverage to Aetna because (1) he thought 
Aetna's premiums were more competitive and (2) it would spare 
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him the personal hassle of going through "an agent of record 
process/1 required to renew the F&D Bond through him. (R. 
2906.12-.14) . 
5. On June 16, 1982, Home, through Bradshaw, applied for 
an Aetna Bond, requesting coverage in the amount of $900,000, 
the same amount of coverage it had with F&D of Maryland. 
(Bradshaw, R. 2906.16-.17,-.22; Trial Exh. 118, 122). 
6. The Aetna Application form, at Question 17, asked Home 
to, "List on page 4 all losses sustained by date, type and 
amount, whether reimbursed or not, during the last six years. 
If none, so state." Home truthfully answered, "None over 
deductible amount." (Trial Exh. 122). 
7. The Application did not ask lor any of the information 
marshalled by Aetna in its Brief which Aetna now claims should 
have been disclosed. (Compare Trial Exh. 122 to summary of 
Robinson and Bradshaw testimony, Aetna Brief, p. 47). 
8. During a routine Federal Home Loan Bank Examination 
begun June 4, 1982, examiners instructed Home to increase its 
Blanket Bond coverage to $1,135 million (Bradshaw, R. 2906.18), 
consistent with government regulatory formulas (Smolka, R. 
2919.79-.80; Bradshaw, R. 2906.17). Home forwarded a request 
for increased coverage to Aetna. (Trial Exh. 334). 
9. Aetna was not able to process Home's Application by 
June 21 (Bradshaw, R. 2906.10), but issued its Bond in July, 
backdated to June 21, 1982 (R. 2906.14). 
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II. The Aetna Bond. 
10. The Aetna Bond (Trial Exh. 343) was issued effective 
June 21, 1982, in the face amount of $1,135 million, for a 
three year term. 
11• The "Preamble" language of Aetna's Bond (p. 2, 1f 1), 
which applies to all the Bond's insuring agreements, obligates 
Aetna to indemnify Home for "loss sustained by [Home] at any 
time but discovered during the Bond Period." 
12. Rider 6041, which replaces Insuring Agreement (A) in 
the text of the Bond, prescribes fidelity coverage. It 
provides that Aetna will indemnify, "Loss resulting directly 
from one or more dishonest or fraudulent acts of an Employee, 
committed anywhere and whether committed alone or in collusion 
with others. . . . " "Dishonest or fraudulent acts" is defined 
as "acts committed by the Employee with the manifest intent: 
(a) to cause the insured to sustain such loss; and (b) to 
obtain financial benefit for the Employee, or for any other 
person or organization intended by the Employee to receive such 
benefit . . . " 
13. General Agreement C provides that Aetna will indemnify 
Home for court costs and attorneys fees "incurred and paid" in 
defending any lawsuit in which the claims, "if established 
against the Insured, would constitute a valid and collectible 
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loss sustained by the Insured under the terms of this Bond." 
The costs/attorneys fees indemnity is in addition to the face 
amount of the Bond. Contrary to Aetna's Fact Statement no. 12 
(Aetna Brief, p. 17), the Bond does not specifically exclude 
fees incurred in defending securities claims. 
14. Home's obligation to notify Aetna of a loss or 
potential loss is governed by Section 4 of the Conditions and 
Limitations Section of the Bond and by Rider 6091. Rider 6091 
amends Section 4 to require that Home notify Aetna of potential 
losses covered under the Bond, as well as covered losses 
already sustained. With regard to potential losses, the Bond 
requires that notice be given "when the Insured becomes aware 
of facts which would cause a reasonable person to assume that a 
loss covered by the bond . . . will be sustained." 
15. Rider 6030(a) excludes from coverage "loss resulting 
directly or indirectly from trading." 
16. Section 11 (1[ 3) of the Bond provides that: "This 
bond shall be terminated or cancelled as to any Employee-(a) as 
soon as the Insured shall learn of any dishonest or fraudulent 
act on the part of such Employee . . ." 
17. Aetna, under the terms of the Bond, and pursuant to 
Home's request, extended coverage under the Bond through August 
20, 1986. (Pretrial Order, Stip. Fact no. 21, R. 727). 
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III. Larry Glad's employment at Home Savings. 
18. Prior to working for Home Savings, Larry Glad worked 
as a loan officer under Bill Cox's supervision at Miller & 
Viehle, a Salt Lake City based mortgage company. Glad was one 
of Miller & Viehle's top producers and, during his employment 
there, earned Cox's confidence. (Cox, R. 2914.60-.65). 
19. Cox, by 1981, headed Home's mortgage loan department 
and managed its 33rd South office. Cox hired Larry Glad as a 
commissioned loan solicitor. Glad started at Home Savings on 
June 1, 1981. (Smolka, R. 2921.127,-.130; Cox, 2914.70). 
20. On or about December 20, 1981, Bill Cox was told that 
Larry Glad had taken a fee in addition to his regular 
commission for arranging a loan. (Pretrial Order, Stip. Fact, 
no. 6, R. 724). Cox received confirmation of the charge about 
a week later. (Cox, R. 2914.137). 
21. Cox terminated Glad effective December 29, 1981, 
immediately upon Glad's return from a weeklong Christmas 
vacation. Independently, Home's management had determined to 
terminate Glad for reasons unrelated to his taking of a fee. 
(Smolka, R. 2917.37-.39; Cox, R. 2914.136). 
IV. The AFCO and AFCO-investor loans. 
22. AFCO was a series of real estate development companies 
which built, managed, and marketed a number of Utah 
developments, primarily the Sherwood Hills resort near Logan, 
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and the Glenmoor Village planned residential community in South 
Jordan. (Stip. Statement read to jury), 
23. Prior to 1982, Grant Affleck, AFCO's President, 
initiated a massive effort to raise funds for AFCO. His 
approach usually required an investor to take out a second 
mortgage loan on his or her home and invest the loan proceeds 
in AFCO. AFCO would promise to repay the loan together with 
additional consideration being promised to the investor. Home 
made such second mortgage loans as did sixteen other Utah-based 
financial institutions. 
24. Home's involvement with AFCO and borrowers who 
invested in AFCO began in early Fall, 1981, when Larry Glad 
approached Bill Cox and advised him about a potential referral 
of $3 million in second mortgage loans. (Cox, R. 2914.99). 
25. In early November, 1981, Glad.arranged a meeting 
between Affleck and Home officers Bradshaw, Smolka, and Cox 
(Smolka, R. 2921.135-.136). At the meeting, Affleck requested 
(1) that Home loan $300,000 directly to AFCO, to be secured by 
Glenmoor Village condominiums and (2) that Home fund up to $3 
million in second mortgage loans which AFCO would refer. 
(Smolka, R. 2921.136-.141; Cox, R. 2914.100-.103). 
26. Home loaned AFCO $100,000 on November 10, 1981, based 
on the strength of the collateral and a positive confirmation 
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of AFCO's payment history from Deseret Federal• (Smolka, R. 
2921.146-.150; Trial Exh. 17). AFCO later repaid its loan. 
27. On or about November 10, 1981, Cox, acting on 
instructions from Fred Smolka, typed up letters committing Home 
to fund up to $3 million in second-mortgage loans, which would 
be referred by AFCO. (Trial Exh. 12; R. 2914.106). The 
letters contemplated that all referred applications would have 
to meet certain underwriting standards: among others, that 
first and second mortgages, together, could not exceed 80% of 
value; qualified appraisals would be required; and 
homeowners/borrowers would be personally responsible for 
repaying loans. (Trial Exh. 11). 
28. On November 18, 1981, Home's Board of Directors 
approved Home's participation in the second-mortgage program; 
but conditioned participation on (1) Home's securing a 
commitment in the secondary market to purchase the loans and 
(2) having each borrower acknowledge that he/she was personally 
responsible for repaying the loan. (Trial Exh. 39). Wallace 
Woodbury, Home's counsel, thereafter prepared acknowledgment 
letters for borrowers to sign. (Trial Exh. 89, 90). 
29. From mid-November, 1981 through early January, 1982, 
Home processed, approved and funded forty-two second-mortgage 
loans (Pretrial Order, Stipulated Fact no. 4, Re 723). 
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30. The loans were "processed" by Larry Glad, with the 
assistance of an AFCO secretary, Valerie Kosta Parker, whom 
AFCO had made available to help with typing and paperwork on 
the loan applications referred by AFCO. (Cox, R. 2914.132). 
31. Home's underwriter Bill Cox approved each of the 
forty-two loans Home made, on the mistaken assumption that the 
credit, income and other information in the loan file was 
accurate and had been properly verified. (Cox, R. 2906.61-.62, 
2905.86). Each loan was also reviewed and approved by MGIC 
Insurance Co. and either Rocky Mountain Federal or First 
Federal Savings of Great Falls, two institutions which 
purchased the second-mortgage loans. (Cox, R. 2905.78). 
32. When certain of the second mortgage loans went into 
default in late February, 1982, Home (1) re-reviewed the loan 
documentation and verified that each borrower had acknowledged 
responsibility to repay the loan and (2) interviewed Cox and 
Elaine Reese concerning the processing and closing of the 
loans. Home concluded that the notes and trust deeds were 
enforceable. (Woodbury, R. 2916.221 -.225; Smolka, R. 
2919.52-.56; Trial Exh. Ill, p. 2). 
33. In April, 1982, several hundred persons who had 
borrowed money from various financial institutions joined to 
collectively file an action in the recently instituted AFCO 
bankruptcy proceedings, entitled Alcorn v. Affleck. The Alcorn 
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Complaint named seventeen financial institutions among its 68 
named defendants and set forth numerous causes of actions which 
allegedly applied across the board to all of the institutions. 
34• On July 2, 1982, the above-mentioned borrowers filed 
essentially the same Complaint in the United States District 
Court, designated Abbott v. Schaffer, the Bankruptcy Court 
having concluded it lacked jurisdiction. On or about July 22, 
1982, the action was severed as to each financial institution. 
The severed portion relating to Home was designated Armitaae v. 
Home Savings (C82-0670K). (Pretrial Order Stip. Fact, R. 
726). Plaintiffs included 36 of the 42 couples who had 
borrowed from Home to invest in AFCO. Discovery in Armitaae 
began in earnest in the Fall of 1982. 
35. On August 14, 1984, the Armitaae jury returned a 
Special Verdict against Home, which found Home liable on five 
of the over twenty theories Plaintiffs pursued. (Pretrial 
Order, Stip. Fact. no. 20, R. 727). 
36. On February 24, 1986, the Court entered judgment in 
the Armitaae case, formally voiding the Plaintiffs' notes and 
trust deeds. (Pretrial Order, Stip. Fact. nos. 22, 23, R. 727). 
37. The Court also, on March 21, 1986, ordered that Home 
pay the Armitaae Plaintiffs their attorneys fees, in the amount 
of $381,294.62. After negotiating a reduction, Home paid 
$190,647.31. 
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V. Glad's dishonest conduct. 
The evidence of Glad's dishonesty, in connection with his 
introduction of AFCO to Home and his role in the processing and 
closing of second mortgage loans, included the following: 
38. In the Fall of 1981, AFCO, unknown to Home Savings, 
was in extreme financial difficulty. (Broadbent, R. 2906.151; 
Westergard, R. 2910.18-.71). Affleck told Bob Mitchell, 
brother of his secretary Cindy Mitchell (Broadbent) that AFCO 
desperately needed additional money; that he would pay a 
handsome fee to anyone who could arrange for additional funds; 
and that he didn't care how the money was obtained. (Mitchell, 
R. 2914.14-.15). 
39. Bob Mitchell, two days later, introduced Affleck to 
Larry Glad at a meeting in Glad's office at Home Savings. 
(Mitchell, R. 2914.16). Mitchell believed that Glad might be 
willing to help because (1) Glad had been more than willing to 
alter information on his sister's loan application (inflated 
income, lengthened time of employment) to enable her to qualify 
for credit, (Mitchell, R. 2914.13-.14; Broadbent, R. 2906.154); 
and (2) Glad, unknown to Home, had diverted to his personal use 
a $14,000 loan commitment payment made to Home by Mitchell's 
company, IVEL Construction. Glad admitted to Mitchell he had 
used the $14,000 to purchase cocaine. (Mitchell, R. 
2914.10-.13). 
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40. After the initial meeting with Affleck, Glad told 
Mitchell, "I've got him. He is in a sinking ship. There is 
nobody else in town that will touch him on financing, and I can 
put these together for him.M Glad added, "I'll make a fortune 
off it." (Mitchell, R. 2914.19). In a follow-up meeting about 
mid to late October at Gino's, a restaurant next door to Home 
Savings, Cindy Mitchell testified that Glad told Affleck he 
could do loans referred by AFCO "if the price was right." 
(Broadbent, R. 2906.154). 
41. Glad assured Affleck that Home could process $3.1 or 
$3.3 million in loans, provided that AFCO pay a 1% origination 
fee directly to Mitchell out of the initial loan to AFCO. 
(Broadbent, R. 2906.155-.156). Glad, without Home's knowledge, 
had Affleck sign a document authorizing a $31,000 fee to 
Mitchell (Trial Exh. 1, 2). Glad proposed to Mitchell that 
Mitchell keep $14,000 as repayment for the diverted money; and 
that he, unknown to Home, would keep the rest. (Mitchell, R. 
2914.21). 
42. Prior to making the $100,000 loan to AFCO, Glad 
obtained credit reports on AFCO, Affleck, and Carvel Shaffer, 
each which contained adverse credit information. (Trial Exh. 
13, 14, 15). Glad withheld the negative reports from his 
supervisors, who never saw them. (Smolka, R. 2919.19-.21; Cox, 
R. 2914.111). 
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43. On November 10/ Glad arranged to close the AFCO loan 
himself (Smolka/ R. 2919.24)/ in place of Elaine Reese/ Home's 
regular ,floan closer/" who was absent from work that day (Cox# 
R. 2914.108-.110). When Cox asked Glad to show him the closing 
statement/ the penciled-in statement Glad showed to Cox did not 
list the $31/000 disbursement to Bob Mitchell/ though the typed 
statement/ which AFCO signed/ did show the fee. (Trial Exh. 
17/ p.2). Glad caused Home to issue a check to Mitchell for 
$31/000 (Trial Exh. 320)/ which Mitchell then split with Glad. 
44. Many of the second-mortgage loan applications AFCO 
referred to Home had been rejected by other institutions. 
(Parker/ R. 2913.21). When Cindy Mitchell volunteered this 
negative information to Glad he responded that that would be no 
problem. (Broadbent/ R. 2906.158). 
45. Cox instructed Glad to call each of the borrowers who 
had previously submitted loan applications to AFCO, and confirm 
(1) that they were still interested in borrowing against the 
equity in their homes and (2) that the information in their 
application was still accurate. Two days later Glad gave a 
list of names to Cox (Trial Exh. 71), whom he said he had 
called. (Cox, R. 2914.115-.116). Borrowers whose names were 
on Glad's list testified that Glad had never called them. 
(E.g. Devey, R. 2911.144). 
- 21 -
46. Parker, whom Affleck had made available to Home to 
assist in processing the second mortgage loans, testified that 
Affleck "told me to go to Home Savings and do what Larry Glad 
wanted me to do. Get those loans through and hurry it up." 
(R. 2913.21). After she had helped at Home for about a week, 
Glad ordered her to alter data on a loan application. (Parker, 
R. 2913.30). Parker, troubled about the incident, complained 
to Affleck. "He [Affleck] told me to do exactly what Larry 
Glad wanted me to do." (R. 2913.30-.31). 
47. Once, when Parker protested Glad's instruction that 
she forge a signature, Glad became irritated and said, "Its 
very simple, Valerie. You just take it and you just do like 
this," and he signed the person's name. Then he added, "Now, I 
don't want to have to do this. I want you to just take care of 
it from here on out." (Parker, R. 2913.35-.36). 
48. As it became evident that certain borrowers AFCO had 
referred could not otherwise qualify for loans, Glad ordered 
that employment dates, income levels, debts, etc. be altered to 
ensure that borrowers would qualify. (Broadbent, 
R. 2906.160-.161; Parker, R. 2913.32-.33; Phippen, R. 
2905.210). Signatures of borrowers on applications and 
employers on employment verifications were forged. (Parker, 
R. 2913.30,-.34; Cassul, R. 2920.84-.86; F.W. Witt, R. 
2905.144,-.148; Pehrson, R. 2905.192,-.194; Rosenloff, 
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R. 2905.264; Sadler, R. 2910.101)• Other alterations included 
fabrication of letters to explain away negative credit reports 
(Sadler, R. 2910.101); invention of fictitious savings accounts 
(F.W. Witt, R. 2905.15); inflation of the value of borrowers' 
assets (Phippen, R. 2905.209); and, as Mrs. Richards testified, 
"Our ages were [lowered] to 50 years, bless them." (R. 
2905.247). 
49. Loan documents were backdated by Elaine Reese to 
circumvent the borrowers* three day right of rescission, to 
allow immediate disbursement of funds to AFCO, on Glad's false 
assurance to Reese that Cox had ordered and approved backdating 
of all the loans. (Reese, R. 2918.111-.113). 
50. With Glad's knowledge, Parker notarized trust deeds 
and other documents, though she had not been present when they 
were signed. (Parker, R. 2913.51-.53). 
51. Following the November 18 Board Meeting (referred to 
in If 28 above), Cox instructed Glad and Reese that one or the 
other of them was to personally close all subsequent loans. 
(Cox, R. 2905.62). Contrary to Cox's express instruction, Glad 
gave loan files to Affleck to close. (Broadbent, R. 2906.180; 
Smolka, R. 2919.17). Affleck told borrowers that AFCO would 
make their loan payments for them. He showed borrowers where 
to sign, explained none of the documents, and let none of the 
borrowers read them. Virtually every borrower testified that 
- 23 -
had a Home employee been present to explain the documents they 
were asked to sign, that they would not have signed the 
documents. (Mrs. Witt, R. 2905.172; Gleed, R. 2905.184; 
Pehrson, R. 2905.200; O.T. Farnsworth, R. 2905.228; O.F. 
Farnsworth, R. 2905.235; Richards, R. 2905.243; Chandler, R. 
2905.257; Rosenloff, R. 2905.263; Scoville, R. 2911.18). 
52. Contrary to Aetna's assertion throughout its Brief 
that Home had discovered Glad's dishonesty vis-a-vis the 
AFCO-investor loans prior to June 21, 1982, the evidence in the 
record indicates that Home did not discover Glad's dishonest 
activity in connection with the AFCO-investor loans until 
doscovery was underway in Armitage, in October-December, 1982. 
(Smolka, R. 2917.22-.26,.40-.41, -.46, 2919.24-.25,.52-.53,-.56, 
-.75-.78, 2920.59; Woodbury, R. 2916.223-.227; Cox, R. 2905.86; 
Trial Exh. Ill, p. 2). 
53. Aetna's assertion that the Federal Home Loan Bank's 
Report of Examination, under date of June 4, 1982, was 
"complete" as of that date and that "Home Savings had immediate 
access to that report" (see Aetena Brief, Fact Statement 
B-2-m), is in error. June 4, 1982 was when the federal 
examiners began their examination at Home Savings; Home did not 
receive a copy of the report until approximately September, 
well after Aetna's Bond was in place. (H. Bradshaw, R. 
2907.155-.159; R. Greenwood, R. 2916.195; E. Weis, R. 
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2909.152). Also, contrary to Aetna's Fact Statement no. 2-n, 
the examiner who wrote the report did not conclude that Home's 
"management," apart from the conduct of its employees, had 
subjected Home to possible losses. (Greenwood, R. 2916.185). 
54. When it completed the Application for the Aetna Bond, 
Home had no idea that it might one day sustain a loss on the 
AFCO-investor loans, that would later give rise to a fidelity 
claim against Aetna's Bond. (Smolka, R. 2917.40-.41,-.46). 
VI. Glad's use of cocaine. 
55. Following his departure from Miller & Viehle and prior 
to his employment at Home Savings, Glad had begun using cocaine 
in significant quantities. (Wolfe (Glad's first wife), R. 
2918.208,-.210-.228); Rasmussen, R. 2923.23). 
56. Bob Mitchell testified that in the October-December, 
1981 time frame he observed Glad on numerous occasions using 
cocaine (R. 2914.29 -.27,.46) and estimated that Glad's habit 
cost $300-$500 a day (R. 2914.37). 
57. Dr. Gary Jorgensen, whose specialty is treatment of 
drug addicts, indicated that a $300 to $500 a day habit would 
categorize Glad as a heavy user, who would be willing to steal 
and deceive in order to obtain the money he needed to support 
his habit. (R. 2907.35-.37). 
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VII. Home's interaction with Aetna. 
58. Based on information it had discovered during the 
course of depositions in Armitage, Home notified Aetna in 
December, 1982, that the plaintiffs' claims might give rise to 
a covered loss under the Bond. (Smolka, R. 2919.75•-78; Trial 
Exh. 119, 120). 
59. In early 1983, Aetna hired a Salt Lake City law firm 
(Suitter, Axland) to monitor the Armitage litigation, to review 
pleadings, sit in on depositions, etc. (Pretrial Order, R. 
726) . 
60. On September 30, 1983, Aetna advised Home in writing 
that the pleadings it had reviewed (the same ones Aetna 
highlights in its Brief) did not set forth any claims that 
would be covered under its Bond and declined to defend Home. 
(Trial Exh. 140). 
61. Aetna has retained the premiums paid by Home to 
purchase its Bond and at no time, during the pendency of the 
Armitage or this litigation, ever tendered the premiums back to 
Home. (R. 2918.85-.86). 
62. Home sustained a net principal loss in the amount of 
$998,623 on its second mortgage loans when the Armitage Court, 
on February 24, 1986 entered judgment avoiding the plaintiffs' 
notes and trust deeds. See Aetna Fact Statement no. 16 (Aetna 
Brief, p. 18). In the present action, Home requests that Aetna 
indemnify it for this loss, pursuant to the terms of its Bond. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I: AETNA MUST INDEMNIFY HOME FOR LOSSES SUSTAINED AND 
DISCOVERED DURING THE BOND PERIOD. 
The Trial Court's denial of Aetna's motion for summary 
judgment re: discovery of loss should be affirmed because (1) 
material facts and inferences from facts were in dispute, 
contrary to Aetna's mischaracterization of the record, and (2) 
Aetna's analysis of the Bond is flawed. 
Aetna's Bond obligates it to indemnify Home for fidelity 
"loss sustained . • . at anytime but discovered during the Bond 
Period." Aetna concedes Home sustained its loss only when the 
Armitaae Court avoided the Armitage plaintiffs' notes and trust 
deeds. Such loss could not have been discovered earlier. 
Thus, Home both "sustained" and "discovered" its "loss" during 
the Aetna Bond Period. Aetna, however, erroneously contends 
that for purposes of coverage, "loss" is "discovered" not when 
or after it is sustained, but when the insured becomes "aware" 
of conditions which may or may not someday result in a loss. 
In so doing, Aetna confuses the separate issues of "coverage" 
and "notice." Aetna's argument (1) is not supported by the 
language of its Bond; (2) ignores that its contract is one of 
indemnity; and (3) is mistakenly based on case law which 
addresses the issue of "notice," not "coverage." 
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POINT II: SECTION 11 DOES NOT EXCUSE AETNA'S OBLIGATION TO 
INDEMNIFY HOME SAVINGS FOR LOSSES SUSTAINED AS A RESULT OF 
LARRY GLAD'S DISHONEST CONDUCT. 
Section 11 of Aetna's Bond eliminates coverage for loss 
caused by dishonest conduct of an employee where, once an 
employee is discovered to be dishonest, he remains in the 
insured's employ and thereafter engages in similar dishonest 
conduct which produces a loss. The policy behind Section 11 
to shift risk of loss for the subsequent misconduct from the 
insurer to the trusting insured. Aetna suggests that Section 
11 goes much further; that it elimiates coverage not only for 
subsequent misconduct, but also for subsequent losses, even i 
caused by misdeeds committed prior to or contemporaneous with 
discovery of the dishonesty. Section 11, however, was not 
intended to revoke or prospectively deny coverage for losses 
that later come to fruition as a result of an employee's prio 
dishonest conduct. Section 11, under the facts of this case, 
does not excuse Aetna's obligation to indemnify Home's 
otherwise covered loss. 
POINT III: AETNA MAY NOT USE THE JURY-S RESPONSES TO SPECIAL 
INTERROGATORIES NOS. 2 AND 4 TO AVOID THE JUDGMENT. 
Aetna asks this Court to reverse the Judgment based on 
answers to two special interrogatories, in which the jury 
concluded that Home had unintentionally failed to disclose 
material information to Aetna. The Trial Court properly 
disregarded the jury's answer to Interrogatory no. 2, finding 
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there was no evidence in the record of nondisclosure of 
material information in response to any question asked in the 
Application. Moreover, all of Aetna's marshalled evidence 
concerns information about which Aetna simply made no inquiry 
in its Application, a distinction that renders both the 
marshalled evidence and former Utah Code Ann. § 31-19-8 
inapplicable. The Trial Court also properly concluded that the 
jury's answer to Interrogatory no. 4 could not provide a basis 
for voiding the Bond, because an insured has no duty to 
volunteer information not requested by the Application. 
Two independent grounds further support affirmation of the 
Trial Court's ruling. First, Aetna is not entitled to the 
remedy of rescission because it never clearly elected 
rescission and never tendered to Home the premiums Home paid, 
but instead chose to keep the premiums and to defend and deny 
coverage. Second, the jury's role with respect to Aetna's 
equitable claim was purely advisory. Thus, the Trial Court was 
free to disregard the jury's response to Interrogatory no. 2. 
POINT IV: AETNA MAY NOT USE THE TRADING EXCLUSION TO AVOID 
PAYING HOME'S LOSSES. 
Rider 6030(a), which excludes from coverage losses 
resulting from "trading," formed the basis for Aetna's second 
motion for summary judgment. Thereafter, Aetna abandoned the 
defense; dropped it from the Pretrial Order and presented no 
evidence on the defense at trial. In so doing, it waived the 
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defense. In any event/ the Trial Court correctly denied 
Aetna's motion because the securities law violations for which 
Home was found liable in Armitage do not equate to "trading, •• 
as used in Rider 6030(a). At best, the -trading loss" 
exclusion, as applied to the second mortgage loans Home made in 
this case, is ambiguous, warranting the conclusion that Home's 
otherwise indemnifiable losses are not excluded from coverage. 
POINT V: NO BASIS EXISTS FOR AETNA1S CLAIMS THAT THE JURY WAS 
IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED AND THAT AETNA WAS PREJUDICED IN 
SUBMITTING ITS THEORY OF THE CASE. 
Aetna asserts that the Court improperly instructed the jury 
and prevented Aetna from presenting its theory of causation to 
the jury. Aetna's argument is without merit because (1) the 
error Aetna now asserts was not properly preserved for appeal, 
Utah R. Civ. P. 51, and (2) the jury was properly instructed. 
Moreover, Aetna was permitted to present its "sole, sufficient 
cause" theory to the jury: it presented evidence consistent 
with its theory; the instructions that were given allowed it to 
present its theory; and it argued its theory in closing 
argument. Finally, Aetna's assertion that the jury should have 
been allowed to "apportion cause" between Glad's dishonesty and 
Home's mismanagement is contrary to the law and is contrary to 
what Aetna, before the Trial Court, conceded was the law. 
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POINT VI: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
REFUSING TO EITHER DISMISS HOME'S COMPLAINT OR REQUIRE JOINDER 
OF F&D OF MARYLAND. 
Aetna contends that the Trial Court should have required 
that F&D of Maryland be joined as a party, yet it offers no 
compelling reason why F&D's presence was necessary. The Trial 
Court, in denying Aetna's motion, listed in detail its 
findings, stating why F&D was not an indispensable party — all 
of which Aetna simply ignores in its Brief. F&D's presence was 
not necessary for the Trial Court and this Court to interpret 
the contract of insurance between Home and Aetna. Furthermore, 
neither F&D nor Aetna was prejudiced by F&D's absence. 
POINT VII: THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED AETNA'S BELATED 
REQUEST TO "OFFSET" HOME SAVING'S JUDGMENT. 
After trial, Aetna sought for the first time an "offset" to 
Home's damages. The Trial Court rejected Aetna's belated 
request because Aetna neither reserved the issue of offset nor 
sought an offset until well after trial. Home never waived its 
right to a jury trial on this issue. The Trial Court's refusal 
to entertain Aetna's untimely request should be affirmed. 
POINT VIII: THE JUDGMENT PROPERLY INCLUDES $190,647.31 IN 
ATTORNEYS FEES THAT HOME SAVINGS PAID TO THE ARMITAGE 
PLAINTIFFS. 
Home's claim for reimbursement of attorneys fees it was 
ordered to pay in the Armitage litigation was reserved for 
determination by the Trial Court following trial. 
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Second-guessing the Trial Court's ruling, Aetna argues (1) that 
Elaine Reese, not Larry Glad, caused the loss; (2) that its 
Bond covers only Mmalum in seM conduct; and (3) that the 
trading exclusion rider excludes the loss from coverage. 
Aetna's first argument, as the Trial Court found, ignores the 
substantial involvement of Larry Glad in the backdating of loan 
documents. The second argument is just plain wrong; conduct 
need not be criminal to be "dishonest" under Rider 6041. The 
third argument ignores that the Armitaae Court based its award 
independently on the federal truth-in-lending statute, which 
provides a basis for the fees award clearly beyond the reach of 
the "trading exclusion" rider. 
POINT IX: THE TRIAL COURT, PURSUANT TO STIPULATION OF THE 
PARTIES, PROPERLY AWARDED HOME SAVINGS ITS REASONABLE ATTORNEYS 
FEES INCURRED IN DEFENDING IN THE ARMITAGE LITIGATION. 
Just prior to entry of judgment, Aetna stipulated that the 
"costs and reasonable attorneys fees" to which Home was 
entitled under Agreement C of the Bond was $437,500, and the 
Court entered judgment based on the Stipulation. In its 
Stipulation, Aetna waived the legal argument it now tries to 
assert on appeal. Furthermore, there is no factual nor legal 
basis for Aetna's claim that Home should be awarded only 
one-seventh the fees Aetna stipulated were "reasonable." 
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RULES FOR CONSTRUING AMBIGUITY 
IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS 
Aetna's introductory summary of the law on construction of 
insurance contracts is accurate—as far as it goes. However, 
Aetna deftly avoids mentioning how ambiguity in a policy of 
insurance is to be construed. 
Ambiguity in Aetna's Bond may need to be addressed by this 
Court. The test for determining whether language in a policy 
of insurance is ambiguous is set forth in LPS Hospital v. 
Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858-59 (Utah 1988). The 
test is: 
Would the meaning [of the language of the 
insurance contract] be plain to a person of 
ordinary intelligence and understanding, 
viewing the matter fairly and reasonably, in 
accordance with the usual and natural 
meaning of the words, and in the light of 
existing circumstances, including the 
purpose of the policyt?] 
As Aetna notes, jjE the terms of an insurance policy are clear 
and unambiguous, they will be interpreted in accordance with 
their plain and ordinary meaning. Valley Bank and Trust Co. v. 
U.S. Life Title Ins. Co. of Dallas, 776 P.2d 933, 936 (Utah 
App. 1989). If, however, the terms are ambiguous, they will be 
interpreted in favor of the insured, in favor of coverage. LPS 
Hospital v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., supra. Provisions 
purporting to exclude coverage, in particular, "are strictly 
construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured." 
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Vallev Bank and Trust, supra at 936. As the Utah Supreme Court 
has held: 
This Court is committed to the policy that, 
in case of ambiguity, uncertainty, or doubt, 
the terms of an insurance contract will be 
construed strictly against the insurer and 
in favor of the insured, and that the 
insured is entitled to the broadest 
protection that he could reasonably believe 
the commonly understood meaning of its terms 
afforded him. 
P.E. Ashton Co. v. Jovner, 406 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1965). 
Similarly, applications for insurance are subject to the 
same rules of construction. Insurers, since they frame the 
inquiries, must keep them free of misleading interpretations. 
Wardle v. International Health & Life Ins. Co., 551 P.2d 623, 
626 (Ida. 1976). All ambiguities in applications for 
insurance, accordingly, will be strictly construed against the 
insurer which drafted the questions. 2 Couch on Insurance 2d 
§ 15.90 (1984); Wardle, supra at 626; Purcell v. Washington 
Fidelity Nat'1. Ins. Co., 16 P.2d 639 (Ore. 1932). MIf any 
construction can reasonably be put on the question and the 
answer [in the application for insurance] such as will avoid a 
forfeiture of the policy on the ground of falsity in the 
answer, that construction will be given, and the policy will be 
sustained.H Olinqer Mutual Benefit Ass'n. v. Christy, 342 P.2d 
1000, 1005 (Colo. 1959), quoting Service Life Ins. Co. of 
Omaha, Neb, v. McCullough, 234 Iowa 817, 13 N.W.2d 440 (1944). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
AETNA MUST INDEMNIFY HOME FOR COVERED LOSSES SUSTAINED AND 
DISCOVERED DURING THE BOND PERIOD. 
Aetna's Bond obligates Aetna to indemnify Home Savings for 
"loss sustained at any time but discovered during the Bond 
Period." Home sustained its losses on the AFCO-investor loans 
when the Armitaae Court voided the borrower's notes and trust 
deeds, during the time the Aetna Bond was in place. Prior to 
the verdict in Armitaae, Home had sustained no loss on the 
AFCO-investor loans which it could have discovered. Indeed, 
Aetna has acknowledged that "Plaintiff had no damages until the 
entry of the judgment, and therefore it had no claim against 
Aetna. . ." (R. 2169). 
In sharp contrast to these plain facts, Aetna contends in 
Point III of its Brief that "loss" is "discovered" not when the 
loss is sustained, or later, but, rather, when the insured 
learns of dishonest conduct of an employee which may or may not 
result in loss at some time in the future. Aetna moved for 
summary judgment asserting that, because Home allegedly knew of 
Glad's dishonest conduct before purchasing the Bond, it had 
"discovered the loss before the Bond went into effect." 
(Aetna's Motion, R. 196-197; Memo, at R. 200-201.20). In 
response, Home disputed both Aetna's legal theory and its 
factual allegation that Home, prior to June, 1982, knew of 
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Glad's dishonest conduct vis-a-vis the AFCO-investor loans. 
(R. 284, 286.2-.4, 286.15-.20, 209.32 n. 1&3, 209.33 n. 7). 
At the same time, because Home could not have discovered 
any loss until, at the earliest, the Armitage jury verdict on 
August 14, 1984, or, as Aetna contends, entry of the Armitage 
judgment on February 24, 1986 (both during the Bond period), 
Home sought a judicial determination that "Home both sustained 
a 'loss1 and 'discovered* that 'loss' during the period the 
Aetna Bond was in effect". (Home's Motion for a Court Order 
Construing the Aetna Bond, R. 218-220; Memo, at R. 208-209.34), 
The Trial Court granted Home's motion, stating: 
This Court specifically rules that plaintiff 
sustained a "loss," as the term "loss" is 
contemplated in the Aetna Bond, on August 
14, 1984. Accordingly, plaintiff discovered 
its "loss sustained" during the period the 
Aetna Bond was in effect. 
(Order construing the Bond, R. 385) . In addition, the Court 
issued a four-page Order and Memorandum Decision (R. 344-347), 
1
 Aetna's statement at page 43 of its Brief that "the Trial 
Court considered the evidence at summary judgment and ruled as 
a matter of law that before Home purchased the Aetna Bond, it 
was aware of Larry Glad's conduct and the problems with the 
AFCO investor loans," blatantly mistates the record. Compare 
to Court's actual ruling quoted infra at 37. Similarly, the 
partial, out-of-context quotation attributed to the Court at 
page 37 of Aetna's Brief misstates the record. The Court 
assumed knowledge of Glad's dishonesty for the purpose of 
ruling on the parties' motions. However, it made no factual 
finding, nor could it have, given that Home disputed Aetna's 
allegation. 
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which rejected Aetna's argument that "loss" can somehow be 
discovered three and one-half years before it actually occurs, 
thereby precluding coverage. The Trial Court held: 
For purposes of this motion, the court 
assumes the evidence establishes as a matter 
of law that the dishonesty of plaintiff's 
employee, Larry Glad, was known before the 
policy period commenced on June 21, 1982. 
This discovery of the dishonesty, however, 
is not discovery of a loss sustained. It is 
not the dishonesty which is insured, but the 
loss sustained thereby. There is no 
evidence that there was any loss sustained 
prior to the judgment in or settlement of 
the Armitage case. The Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board Report (Def. App. 0), dated June 
4, 1982, itself indicates that plaintiff 
Home Savings was subjected only to "possible 
losses." A loss cannot be discovered until 
sustained: since the latter occurred during 
the policy period, the discovery thereof 
could not have occurred earlier. 
(R. 344-345) (Emphasis added). 
If Aetna is appealing the denial of its motion for summary 
judgment, then Aetna's appeal fails because there were material 
facts or inferences from facts in dispute; and Aetna has not 
demonstrated that Home could not have prevailed on this issue 
at trial. Aetna tries to finesse this obstacle by pretending 
that the Court found "as a matter of law" that "before Home 
Savings purchased the Aetna Bond, it was aware of Larry Glad's 
conduct and the problems with the AFCO-investor loans." (Aetna 
Brief, p. 43). As noted above, the Court made no such finding 
"as a matter of law," or otherwise. 
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If on the other hand, Aetna's appeal is from the Order 
construing the Bond (R. 384), the appeal fails because Aetna's 
legal analysis is mistakenly based, not on the Bond's coverage 
provisions, but rather on its notice provisions and case law 
interpreting an insured's obligation to give timely notice of 
loss or potential loss. 
A. THE ISSUE OF "COVERAGE" IS DISTINCT FROM THE ISSUE 03? 
"NOTICE", WHICH AETNA HAS NOT APPEALED. 
At the outset, it is important to distinguish between 
"coverage" and the obligation to give "notice" of potential 
loss. The Trial Court's Order and Decision resolved only the 
issue of coverage. The obligation to give notice, however, is 
a different issue, which is based on separate and distinct 
provisions of the Bond. Aetna has not appealed from the 
Court's rulings on the issue of notice. 
(1) "Coverage" is governed by the "Preamble" and Rider 
6041. 
The issue of coverage with respect to fidelity claims is 
governed by what Aetna refers to as the "Preamble" (Bond, p. 2, 
1f 1) and Rider 6041. The Preamble, which applies to all the 
various types of risks insured by the Bond, obligates Aetna to 
indemnify the Insured for "loss sustained . . . at any time but 
discovered during the Bond Period." Rider 6041 provides that 
the Bond insures against "loss resulting directly from one or 
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more dishonest or fraudulent acts of an employee, committed 
anywhere and committed alone or in collusion with others 
. • • " The Preamble, together with Rider 6041, thus determine 
Aetna's obligation to indemnify Home for losses caused by an 
employee's dishonest conduct. The propriety of the Court's 
pretrial coverage ruling must be evaluated against these 
provisions. 
(2) The obligation to give HnoticeH is governed by Section 
4 of the "Conditions and Limitations" Section and bv 
Rider 6091. 
An entirely separate issue in this lawsuit concerned Home's 
obligation to give notice. This obligation is prescribed by 
"Section 4" of the "Conditions and Limitations" segment of 
Aetna's Bond, as modified by Rider 6091(1[ 2). Section 4 
provides that "at the earliest practical moment after discovery 
of loss hereunder the Insured shall give the Underwriter 
written notice." Rider 6091, which is tacked onto and amends 
Section 4, defines "discovery" and further obligates the 
insured to give notice of a potential loss. Rider 6091(1f 2) 
states: 
2. The attached bond is further amended by 
inserting the following as the final 
paragraph of Section 4: 
"Discovery occurs when the Insured 
becomes aware of facts which would 
cause a reasonable person to assume 
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that a loss covered by the bond has 
been or will be incurred even though 
the exact amount or details of loss may 
not be then known. Notice to the 
insured of an actual or potential claim 
by a third party which alleges that the 
Insured is liable under circumstances, 
which, if true, would create a loss 
under this bond constitutes such 
discovery.H 
Neither Section 4 nor Rider 6091 is an -insuring agreement," 
and neither purports to amend the coverage language of the 
-insuring agreements- segment of the Bond. 
Aetna reserved for trial the issue of whether the notice 
given by Home in December 1982 was timely. (Pretrial Order, R. 
719 at 721, 729). It put on evidence at trial. The Trial 
Court, however, ruled that Aetna failed to prove it was 
prejudiced by any alleged failure on Home's part to timely 
notify Aetna of a potential loss and declined to submit the 
issue of notice to the jury. (R. 2923.218-.220; R. 1337). 
Aetna has not appealed the Court's ruling on "notice." Yet 
Aetna devotes much of its brief enumerating lawsuits in which 
Home was involved in 1982. The existence of these lawsuits, 
however, does not alter when Home discovered it had actually 
sustained a loss. Moreover, though Aetna now attaches 
significance to these lawsuits, it conveniently fails to 
mention that, having itself reviewed these very same lawsuits, 
it wrote Home on September 30, 1983 and advised it that the 
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allegations set forth in those lawsuits did not state any 
claims covered by the Bond. (Trial Exh. 140). Having failed 
to prove prejudice with respect to notice and having chosen not 
to appeal the Court's ruling on notice, Aetna should not be 
permitted to resurrect the issue of "timely noticeM under the 
guise of coverage. 
B. FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING COVERAGE, A "LOSS" 
CANNOT BE "DISCOVERED" UNTIL SUCH TIME AS IT OCCURS. 
This issue turns on when Home discovered that it had 
sustained a loss on the AFCO-investor loans. Did it discover 
the loss during the time the Aetna Bond was in effect, in which 
case Home's loss is covered by the Bond? Or, did it somehow 
discover it had sustained a "loss" prior to June 21, 1982, 
before the Bond became effective, as Aetna asserts? 
The Preamble language determines whether an indemnifiable 
loss falls before, within, or after the time period the Bond is 
in effect. It states: 
The Underwriter . . . agrees . . . . with 
respect to loss sustained by the Insured at 
any time but discovered during the Bond 
Period, to indemnify and hold harmless the 
Insured for: [various types of loss covered 
by the bond]. 
Very simply, "loss" may be sustained during or prior to the 
term of the Bond and still be covered. Coverage obtains for 
loss caused by an employee's dishonesty if during the Bond 
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period, the insured (1) can establish that it has sustained a 
loss (Preamble)/ and (2) learns the cause of loss which it has 
sustained to be dishonesty of an employee (Rider 6041). Since 
Home/ by Aetna's admission/ did not sustain a loss until such 
time as the Court in Armitage voided the AFCO-investors' notes 
and trust deeds (see Aetna's Brief/ Fact Statement no. 16, p. 
18)/ it follows that Home's discovery of a loss covered by the 
Bond occurred only once judgment was entered. Home could not 
have discovered the loss more than three and one-half years 
earlier, as Aetna asserts. 
Nonetheless, Aetna contends that "loss refers to the 
awareness of conditions out of which a claim may arise/ not to 
the insured's adjudicated liability for that loss." (Brief/ p. 
39). Aetna's metaphysical definition of "loss," and its 
conception of "discovery of loss/" is unpersuasive for the 
following reasons: (1) it is inconsistent with the language of 
the Bond; (2) it is inconsistent with principles of indemnity 
law; (3) it is not supported by the cases Aetna cites; and (4) 
it would have adverse policy consequences if adopted as a rule 
of law by this Court. 
(1) Aetna's interpretation is inconsistent with the 
language of the Bond. 
Aetna agreed to indemnify Home "with respect to loss 
sustained by [Home] at any time but discovered during the Bond 
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period," for "loss resulting directly from dishonest or 
fraudulent acts of an employee." Until an employee's dishonest 
act results in actual loss, the insured has no loss to be 
indemnified. As the Trial Court correctly pointed out in its 
Memorandum Decision, the Bond insures against "loss" caused by 
dishonest conduct. It does not insure against mere dishonesty 
2 
in the absence of actual loss. 
In contrast, Section 4/Rider 6091(If 2), on which Aetna 
relies, does not govern coverage, nor does it amend or modify 
the coverage provisions of the Bond. It does not, for 
instance, redefine "loss" or "loss sustained." Its purpose is 
apparent: to encourage insureds to give reasonably prompt 
notice to insurers of even potential losses so the insurer can 
monitor potential claims and protect its rights. 
Aetna's attempt to convert Section 4/Rider 6091 into an 
"insuring agreement," or coverage provision, reflects its 
fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose, meaning, and 
effect of Section 4 and Rider 6091. These provisions are not 
grafted onto the coverage provisions. Aetna's argument 
attempts to change the indemnification language from "loss 
z
 The clauses in the Preamble, "sustained by the Insured at 
any time" and "discovered during the Bond Period" are adjective 
clauses. Each clause modifies the noun "loss." Neither clause 
modifies or refers to the word "dishonesty," which does not 
even appear in the Preamble. 
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sustained . . . at any time but discovered during the Bond 
Period- to "Aetna may indemnify for loss, but only if the 
dishonesty which caused the loss is discovered within the Bond 
period." But this is not what the Bond says. Aetna's tortured 
interpretation, which requires that words be given meaning 
contrary to their normal usage, at most suggests that there may 
be ambiguity in Aetna's Bond. Home, as the Insured, is 
entitled to have such ambiguity construed in its favor and in 
favor of coverage. 
(2) Aetna's interpretation is inconsistent with principles 
of indemnity law. 
Aetna's assertion that -loss" is a state of mental 
awareness, and can be discovered long before it occurs, is 
irreconcilable with principles of indemnity law. Aetna agreed 
to indemnify Home for loss it sustained. Fidelity Bond cases 
have long held that before an Insured can successfully claim 
under a bond, it must first prove that it has sustained "an 
actual, present loss." Continental Cas. Co. v. First Nat'l. 
Bank of Temple, 116 F.2d 885, 887 (5th Cir.), cert, denied 85 
L.Ed. 1533 (1941); 35 Am.Jur.2d Fidelity Bonds & Insurance § 39 
(1967). The "indemnitor is not liable for a claim made against 
the indemnitee until the indemnitee suffers actual loss by 
being compelled to pay the claim." Gribaldo, Jacobs, Jones and 
Associates v. Aqrippina Versicherunqes A.G., 476 P.2d 406, 413 
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(Cal. 1970)(errors and omissions policy; emphasis added); see 
also 41 Am.Jur.2d Indemnity § 29 at 720 (1968). 
The term "indemnify" has the same meaning in fidelity bond 
cases: 
[A] contract of fidelity insurance is a 
contract against loss. It is a contract of 
indemnity on which the insurer is liable 
only in the event of loss sustained by the 
obligee in consequence of conduct of the 
nature specified in the contract. It has 
been held that there can be no recovery on a 
fidelity bond in the absence of loss or 
damage to the insured, and lack of any 
pecuniary loss by the obligee from the 
wrongful acts constitutes a good defense, 
since in such case no recovery can be had. 
13 Couch on Insurance 2d § 46:219 at 163 (1982); see also 
American Empire Ins. Co. of So. Dakota v. Fidelity & Deposit 
Co. of Md., 408 F.2d 72, 77 (5th Cir. 1969)(holding that, 
because a fidelity bond is an -indemnity insurance contract," 
Mthe insurer's liability does not arise until the insured has 
suffered a proven loss.-); In re Schutler, Green & Co., 93 F.2d 
810, 812 (4th Cir. 1938); Towne Management Corp. v. Hartford 
Accident and Indemnity Co., 627 F.Supp. 170, 174 (D. Md. 1985); 
American Surety Co. of New York v. Capitol Building & Loan 
Ass'n., 50 P.2d 792, 794 (Colo. 1935).3 
3
 Insurers have used this rule affirmatively in actions 
brought by claimants who have obtained a money judgment against 
an insured, arguing that until actual financial (continued) 
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Under principles of indemnity law, Home clearly had no loss 
capable of being indemnified prior to June 21, 1982,. Home, 
accordingly, could not have discovered it had a covered loss 
before it purchased the Aetna Bond, as Aetna contends. 
(3) Aetna's interpretation is not supported by the cases 
it cites. 
The cases Aetna cites do not support Aetna's erroneous 
conclusion that coverage turns on when the insured discovers 
evidence of dishonesty on the part of its employee. 
First, with two principal exceptions, USLife Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n. v. National Sur. Corp. and Continental Ins. Co. v. 
Morgan, Olmstead, the cases Aetna cites address the issue of 
timely notice. They do not address the issue of coverage. 
E.g., FDIC v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 426 F.2d at 739 
(holding, "The word 'loss* as used in the notice requirements 
of the bonds means . . . M ) ; Perkins v. Clinton State Bank, 593 
F.2d at 333 (stating, -The meaning of 'discovery' in timely 
notice provisions has been judicially construed . . . ); 
Alfalfa Electric Cooperative v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 376 
F.Supp. at 906 ("discovery of loss" discussed within context of 
3
 (continued) detriment is incurred, the insured does not 
have a "loss" covered under the Bond. E.g., Ronnau v. Caravan 
Intl. Corp., 468 P.2d 118 (Kans. 1970) (emphasizing that a 
fidelity bond is a contract of indemnity against loss) . 
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whether insured had complied with condition requiring it to 
give notice "within a reasonable time after discovery" of any 
covered loss). Likewise, the statement from Couch (Aetna 
Brief, p. 39) is lifted from a section entitled "Notice of 
Loss." 13A Couch on Insurance 2d § 49:216 at 414 (1982). 
The first of the two exceptions, USLife v. National Surety 
Corp., 171 Cal. Rptr. 393 (Cal. App. 1981), purports to address 
"coverage" and involves successive bonds, but is otherwise 
distinguishable. In USLife, Fireman's Fund issued a Bond, 
which was subsequently displaced by a National Surety Bond. 
The issue was whether the insured, USLife, could claim against 
the second, National Surety Bond. USLife is distinguishable 
because, unlike here, the Court assumed that the Insured's loss 
had actually been sustained and was known to have occurred 
during the period of the first Bond. Id. at 396, 398. The 
question addressed was whether USLife had also discovered, 
during the term of the first bond, the employee's dishonesty 
which caused the loss. Finding that USLife had both sustained 
its loss and discovered the dishonest acts which caused the 
loss during the term of the first bond, the Appeals Court 
affirmed the Trial Court's judgment in favor of National Surety. 
Continental Ins. v. Morgan, Olmstead, 148 Cal. Rptr. 57 
(Cal. App. 1978) mentions "discovery of loss" in the context of 
coverage, but resolves the issue in a manner that would dictate 
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Home's loss being covered by Aetna's Bond. In Morgan, Olmstead 
the claimant was seeking indemnification for attorneys fees it 
had expended in successfully defending against a third party 
lawsuit, which had liability attached, would have established a 
covered loss under one or both of two successive bonds. A 
careful reading of Morgan, Olmstead, however, reveals that 
Aetna Insurance Co. argued that its Bond, the first one, could 
not indemnify its Insured "because the loss was not discovered 
until after the policy terminated." Id. at 60. The appellate 
court resolved the coverage issue by concluding that the bond 
language was ambiguous: that "discovery of loss" could be 
construed to mean when facts giving rise to a later claim are 
discovered by the insured, when a claim is made against the 
insured that may result in a judgment, or when the claim is 
settled or the judgment paid. Id. at 66. Noting that 
ambiguity in a policy of insurance must be construed in favor 
of coverage, the Court concluded that the insured could 
properly claim against either bond. The same approach applied 
here results in the conclusion that Home's loss is covered by 
Aetna's Bond. 
Moreover, none of Aetna's cases, with the exception of 
Continental Ins. v. Morgan, Olmstead, focus, within the context 
of coverage, on the situation where discovery of dishonest 
conduct precedes incurrence of loss. As the California Court 
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of Appeals later noted in Pacific-Southern Mortgage Trust v. 
Insurance Co. of No. America, 212 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1985), albeit 
in the context of notice, this distinction is especially 
important where a dishonest employee induces a financial 
institution to make mortgage-backed loans. 
However, in the case of a secured loan made 
because of fraudulent misrepresentations, 
the fraud and the loss do not necessarily 
occur at the same time. The loss mav occur 
much later or not at all since the debtor 
may eventually become creditworthy or the 
underlying property may appreciate in value 
so that no actual loss is ever suffered. 
Id. at 757 (emphasis added). Pacific-Southern also criticized 
the USLife court for assuming that the Insured's loss had 
occurred during the period of the first bond, without having 
analyzed when, consistent with principles of indemnity law, the 
Insured had actually sustained a loss on secured loans it had 
made. 
(4) Adopting Aetna's interpretation of "Discovery of Loss" 
would have adverse policy consequences. 
Adoption of Aetna's interpretation of "discovery of loss" 
and coverage would have adverse policy consequences in cases 
where discovery of dishonesty precedes potential loss and, 
hence, discovery of any actual loss sustained. Insureds, to 
protect their rights, would be forced to immediately sue their 
carriers even though a loss might never result from the 
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dishonesty. At the very least/ judicial economy would be 
sacrificed. Moreover, Aetna's interpretation would force an 
insured to defend one lawsuit by denying liability by, for 
example, defending the honesty of the person who arguably 
caused the loss; while simultaneously prosecuting an action 
against its carrier, alleging it had already suffered a "loss" 
caused by the dishonesty of its employee. Such conflict of 
interest places the insured in an untenable position. It would 
also prejudice the insurer by discouraging the insured to 
vigorously defend third party claims leveled against it, which, 
if true, would saddle it with a loss but would make the insurer 
liable on its bond. 
The Court, in conclusion, correctly interpreted the 
coverage provisions of the Bond. Accordingly, its decision 
should be affirmed. 
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POINT II. 
SECTION 11 DOES NOT EXCUSE AETNA§S 
OBLIGATION TO INDEMNIFY HOME SAVINGS FOR 
LOSSES SUSTAINED AS A RESULT OF LARRY GLAD'S 
DISHONEST CONDUCT. 
In Point I of its Brief, Aetna argues that from the moment 
it issued its Bond to Home Savings in June 1982, there was no 
coverage for Home's losses caused by the dishonest acts of its 
former employee Larry Glad - even though the losses were 
admittedly sustained only after the Bond was in effect. 
Aetna's assertion is unsupported by the language of the Bond 
and is inconsistent with the purpose, policy, and philosophy 
underlying the Bond. If adopted, it would produce an 
unconscionable result not only here, but in all cases where a 
loss is not sustained prior to or contemporaneous with 
discovery of a dishonest act. 
A. LANGUAGE AND PURPOSE OF SECTION 11. 
Section 11, <\\ 3 of the Aetna Bond provides: 
This bond shall be deemed terminated or 
cancelled as to any Employee - (a) as soon 
as the Insured shall learn of any dishonest 
or fraudulent act on the part of such 
Employee, without prejudice to the loss of 
any Property then in transit in the custody 
of such Employee. 
The obvious purpose of the Section 11 termination-as-
to-an-employee provision is to mitigate potential losses by 
encouraging the insured to remove from its employment persons 
whose dishonest proclivities have become known. Boston Mutual 
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Life Insurance Co, v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co,, 613 F.Supp. 
1090/ 1102 (D. Mass, 1985). The philosophy underlying this 
provision is that an insured/ once it learns of the dishonest 
proclivities of an employee/ ought to bear the risk for loss 
caused by subsequent dishonest conduct of that employee, if the 
insured elects to keep that person in its employment. 13 Couch 
on Insurance 2d § 46:247 (1982). Noticeably absent from 
Section 11 however/ is any language eliminating coverage for 
losses that later come to fruition from the discovered act, or 
from prior dishonest acts. 
Ritchie Grocer Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 426 F.2d 
499 (8th Cir. 1970)/ illustrates the context in which Section 
11/ or similar language, is intended to function. In Ritchie 
Grocer, the insured (Ritchie) acting upon an employment 
application from a Wade Kemp/ contacted the local sheriff who 
informed it that nine months earlier Kemp and others had broken 
into a business and had stolen tires and money. Ritchie's 
hiring manager dismissed the theft as a boyhood prank and 
decided to give Kemp a chance. Kemp was hired and 18 months 
later he embezzled $17/486.20. When Ritchie then made a claim 
on its fidelity bond/ its insurer understandably maintained 
that Ritchie/ in knowingly hiring someone who in the past had 
stolen, assumed the risk of that person later engaging in 
similar dishonest conduct. 
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Thus, Section 11 excludes coverage for acts committed after 
an insured learns of an employee's dishonesty. It does not, 
however, retroactively revoke coverage for previously committed 
misdeeds that subsequently result in loss. Yet this is the 
interpretation Aetna urges. Aetna's superficial Section 11 
analysis was considered and rejected by Judge Murphy, who 
explained: 
[T]he insured is going to take the risk on 
an employee for losses sustained as a result 
of that employee's conduct after the time it 
learned of his or her dishonest conduct. 
But if losses occur after thev learn of it, 
as a result of his or her conduct, before 
the insured learned of it, the insurer is 
going to pay. 
(R. 2912.209, lines 4-9)(emphasis added). 
Aetna's reliance on Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. 
Central Bank of Houston, 672 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. App. 1984), is 
misplaced. That decision, although confusing, actually 
supports coverage here. There, the Central Bank of Houston 
sustained losses on certain loans made by its president, Joseph 
DeLorenzo. The jury found that the Bank's Board of Directors 
learned of a dishonest act on the part of DeLorenzo on or 
before December 11, 1974. Consequently, the Court held: 
[T]he bond coverage terminated under Section 
11 of the bond as to DeLorenzo on December 
11, 1974, and appellant is not liable for 
any losses resulting from the dishonesty of 
DeLorenzo occurring after December 11, 
1974. Appellant is only liable for the loss 
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found by the jury of a $200/000 loan on 
July 22, 1974 before the bond coverage 
terminated on December 11, 1974. 
(Id. at 650; emphasis added). As it properly should have, the 
Central Bank of Houston Court distinguished between dishonest 
acts occuring prior to discovery of dishonesty and those 
thereafter. This is apparent from the Court's holding and the 
fact that the court allowed recovery for the July loan, which 
likely had not materialized into an actual loss prior to the 
December discovery of dishonesty. 
Common sense supports Home's analysis. An insured cannot 
control exposure for unknown acts or the later consequences of 
previously discovered acts. That is the very reason for 
procuring fidelity insurance coverage. Aetna's strained 
interpretation would effectively convert coverage from "loss 
which results from a dishonest act" (Rider 6041) to "loss which 
results from and is sustained prior to or contemporaneously 
with discovery of the dishonest act." Yet this language is not 
found in the bond, is inconsistent with other provisions of the 
4 
bond and is contrary to the expectation of the insured. It 
4
 For example, the Preamble, as noted in the previous 
section, obligates Aetna to indemnify loss sustained at any 
time. Moreover, Rider 6091 clearly contemplates the 
possibility of a future loss covered by the Bond arising out of 
the past conduct of an employee, by requiring that the Insured 
give notice of "loss covered by the bond [that] will be 
incurred . . . " 
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is also contrary to the public policy that mandates financial 
institutions to obtain insurance protection against loss caused 
by dishonesty of its employees. 
B. SECTION 11 DOES NOT AVOID COVERAGE FOR LOSSES 
SUSTAINED BY HOME SAVINGS WHICH THE JURY FOUND 
RESULTED FROM THE DISHONEST ACTS OF LARRY GLAD. 
Prior to trial, the Trial Court ruled as a matter of law 
that Home Savings did not sustain a loss on the AFCO-investor 
loans until, at the earliest, the Armitaae jury returned its 
verdict against Home Savings on August 14, 1984. Aetna 
concedes that Home's loss resulted from the Armitaae Judgment. 
(Aetna Brief, Fact Statement no. 16, p. 18). 
The jury in this case found that Larry Glad engaged in 
dishonest conduct, as defined by the Aetna Bond, in connection 
with Home's loans to the Armitaae plaintiffs. (Special 
Verdict, answer no. 1., R. 1347). It next found that the 
losses Home sustained in connection with 34 of the 36 loans to 
the AFCO investors resulted directly from Glad's dishonest 
conduct. (Special Verdict, answers no. 2 and 3.) Glad's 
dishonesty in connection with those loans attached from their 
very inception. (See Fact Statements 38-51). 
In response to Special Interrogatories nos. 5-8, the jury 
found that someone at Home learned of a dishonest act by Larry 
Glad unrelated to the AFCO investor-loans in or about 
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mid-December 1981. Aetna now claims this discovery of an 
unrelated dishonest act automatically terminated coverage as to 
losses sustained several years later as a consequence of Larry 
Glad's prior conduct with respect to the AFCO-investor loans. 
Common sense dictates that it does not. Moreover, resolving 
this issue in Aetna's favor would require a factual finding as 
to whether the discovery of the non-related dishonest act in 
mid-December predated Larry Glad's dishonest conduct which 
caused Home's losses at issue in this litigation. Yet Aetna 
never requested such a factual determination by the jury on 
this issue. Further, Aetna did not object to the special 
interrogatories propounded to the jury or ask for clarification 
with respect to this issue. The evidence at trial demonstrated 
that Glad's conduct with respect to the AFCO-investor loans 
infected them from the very beginning, prior to mid-December 
1981, and that virtually all the loans had been processed and 
underwritten prior to Home's discovery of an unrelated 
dishonest act. (Trial Exh. 79, 383; Cox test., R. 2905.86). 
This Court should not indulge Aetna's belated 
trial-by-hindsight request. This is particularly so because 
5
 Although the jury did not identify the act or who 
discovered it, as Aetna suggested in closing argument (R. 
2917.193), the incident likely refers to Glad's effort, about 
mid-December, to convince a teller to issue a cashier's check 
in exchange for a personal check. (Pewtress test., R. 
2920.125-.128). 
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Aetna does not even argue that the jury's verdict is not 
supported by substantial evidence of Glad's prior dishonesty 
that caused Home's losses• Indeed, the Trial Court commented 
after trial that: 
At the time of the discovery of his 
dishonesty. Glad had already set in motion 
the matters which ultimately resulted in the 
losses sustained by Home, In the context of 
such losses sustained well after the 
consummation of the dishonest acts, and the 
discovery of other dishonest acts referenced 
in the jury's responses to Interrogatory 
Nos. 5-8, it would be nonsensical to 
discharge Aetna under Section 11 of the bond, 
(R. 2079-80; emphasis added). This court should likewise 
reject Aetna's Section 11 argument and affirm the existence of 
the fidelity coverage Aetna agreed to provide Home under the 
Bond. 
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POINT III. 
AETNA MAY NOT USE THE JURY'S RESPONSES TO SPECIAL 
INTERROGATORIES NOS. 2 AND 4 TO AVOID THE JUDGMENT. 
Aetna seeks reversal of the Judgment entered in favor of 
Home Savings based on the jury's answers to Special 
Interrogatories nos. 2 and 4. Aetna contends that 
unintentional nondisclosure of material facts by Home/ in 
connection with its Application for Bond coverage (Trial 
Exhibit 122), makes its Bond Mvoid ab initio" and entitles it 
to rescission* (See Aetna's Answer to Amended Complaint, 
Twelfth Defense, R. 44, 51). Although this Court need not even 
address this defense for the reasons set forth below, it fails 
because (1) Home answered the Application correctly and there 
was no failure to disclose in response to questions in the 
Application; and (2) Home had no duty to volunteer information 
or judgments not requested. Furthermore, the relief Aetna 
seeks is not available as a matter of law, because Aetna never 
clearly elected rescission nor tendered back to Home the 
premiums it paid; and the jury's answers to the Special 
Interrogatories relating to Aetna's rescission defense were 
advisory and not binding on the Trial Court. Thus, Aetna's 
entire analysis on this point is purely academic. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF AETNA'S RESCISSION DEFENSE 
In its Answer dated May 29, 1986, Aetna asserted in its 
Twelfth Defense that its Bond was void ab initio as a result of 
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material misrepresentations and omissions by Home in connection 
with its Application. (R. 51). Home moved to strike this 
defense (R. 237-239); and Aetna agreed to withdraw it (R. 
651-57). When Aetna then refused to formally withdraw it, Home 
requested Aetna admit that the defense failed as a matter of 
law. In response, Aetna this time withdrew the defense. 
(R. 666). Subsequently, just before trial, the Court allowed 
Aetna to withdraw its withdrawal and reassert its "Twelfth 
Defense." (R. 2912.129-.134). Even so, Aetna neglected this 
defense throughout the first three and one-half weeks of 
trial , until at the last possible moment Aetna called, over 
Home's objection, a surprise, previously undesignated witness -
David Robinson, one of Aetna's underwriters, to testify on this 
issue. (R. 2916.28) 
As Judge Murphy explained in a twenty-three page post-trial 
Memorandum Decision, because Aetna did not focus on this 
defense until the very last days of trial, he was not able to 
take as studied an approach as he would have liked. 
(Memorandum Decision, R. 2058, 2066). Therefore, he cautiously 
"chose to submit to the jury every possible factual issue and 
to sort through the results following trial." (R. 2066). 
6
 It was not until Nov. 20 that Aetna submitted a memorandum 
on the issue, which the Court had requested before trial (see 
R. 2919.194-.196); 2923.217-.218; 2918.86). The trial began 
Oct. 27. 
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Judge Murphy did this by drafting his own special 
interrogatories/ separate and apart from the Special Verdict 
submitted to the jury on Home's legal claims against Aetna. 
Judge Murphy explained/ however/ that the circumstances under 
which the Bond would be invalidated would be determined by the 
Court. (Id./ R. 2917.62). 
After hearing all the evidence and studying the transcripts 
of the witnesses' trial testimony/ the Trial Court found that 
there was no evidence that Home omitted facts requested by the 
Application. It therefore disregarded the jury's answer to 
Special Interrogatory no. 2. (Memorandum Decision, R. 2058/ 
2067-2071; Order, R. 2434). The Trial Court added that/ had it 
had the time to deliberate/ it# in retrospect/ would not have 
submitted Special Interrogatory no. 2 to the jury. (id./ R. 
2071). Similarly/ after reviewing transcripts and the law, the 
Trial Court ruled that Home had no duty to volunteer 
information outside the Application, and concluded that the 
jury's answer to Interrogatory no. 4 could provide no legal 
basis for rescinding the Bond. (Id.# R. 2077) 
A. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT HOME FAILED TO DISCLOSE 
INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE APPLICATION. 
Former Utah Code § 31-19-8 enumerates the circumstances 
under which an insurance policy may be avoided because of 
"misrepresentations/ omissions, concealment of facts, and 
incorrect statements" in an application for insurance. As 
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Aetna correctly points out, an alleged misrepresentation, 
omission, etc. need not be made with intent to defraud or 
mislead. Aetna fails to mention, however, that the alleged 
misrepresentation, omission, etc. must be in response to a 
question asked in the application, a condition that literally 
negates Aetna's entire analysis. Wardle v. International 
Health & Life Insurance Co.. 551 P.2d 623, 628 (Idaho 1976); 
Roess v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 383 F.Supp. 1231, 
1236 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (interp. Fla. stat.)(both cases 
interpreting statutes virtually identical to Utah's former 
Section 31-19-8). If the insurer does not inquire, then 
Section 31-19-8 simply has no application. 
In response to Special Interrogatory no. 2, the jury 
concluded that Home unintentionally failed to disclose material 
facts in connection with the Application which Home completed 
June 16, 1982. All of the evidence which arguably would 
support this conclusion, marshalled by Aetna in its Brief at 
page 47, consists of testimony by Aetna's underwriter, David 
Robinson, and its agent, Don Bradshaw. Yet, as Judge Murphy 
found after "cautiously" reviewing this testimony, none of the 
evidence speaks directly to the key issue of what information 
was required in response to the Application. (Memorandum 
Decision, R. 2069-70). 
This is especially so in the case of Robinson, where all 
his testimony regarding allegedly material nondisclosures 
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concerned information about which Aetna simply made no 
inquiry, Robinson, for example, admitted that Aetna did not 
ask about pending litigation in the Application, though it has 
since added such a question (R. 2916.43-.45) and that the 
Application asked only about current policies, in effect in 
June, 1982, and current employees; not past policies nor former 
employees. (Robinson, R. 2916.41-.42,-.48; Memorandum Dec, R. 
2058, 2070; Application, Trial Exh. 122). See U.S. Fidelity St 
Guaranty Co. v. Empire State Bank, 448 F.2d 360, 366 (8th Cir. 
1971) (Bank not required to disclose suspicions about former 
employees on bond application, where not asked about former 
employees). Robinson also acknowledged there was nothing in 
the Application that would have suggested to Home that it 
should have volunteered information not asked. (R. 
2916.42,-.50-.51). 
The closest Aetna can come to making an argument is 
Question no. 17 in the Application, which asked: 
MList on page 4 all losses sustained by 
date, type and amount, whether reimbursed or 
not, during the last six years. If none, so 
state." [Emphasis added]. 
Home responded, 
"None over deductible amount." 
(Emphasis added). A MyesH answer to Question no. 17 would have 
directed Home's attention to page 4, on which appeared a chart 
entitled "Six-Year Loss Information from to ." The 
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fourth column on page 4 of the chart inquired about the "amount 
of loss pending." Question 17/ however, did not call for any 
information which Home failed to disclose. 
First, Home's response to Question no. 17 was factually 
correct. As even Aetna acknowledges. Home did not sustain a 
loss on the AFCO-investor loans until well after June, 1982 
(Aetna Brief, Fact Statement no. 16, p. 18; also p. 59). There 
was no evidence that Home had sustained any losses on any other 
loans or losses of any other nature, greater than the Aetna 
Bond's $5,000 deductible in the six years prior to June 16, 
1982. Don Bradshaw, Aetna's agent, further added that just the 
fact of a lawsuit, "by a disgruntled borrower" for example, 
"doesn't create a loss." (R. 2916.59). 
Stretching to find something in the record that conceivably 
could constitute a nondisclosure in response to Question no. 
17, Aetna asserts that "Home was already booking and 
experiencing losses related to the loans . . .." (Aetna Brief, 
p. 54 - no citation to the record). Yet, as previously noted, 
Home had sustained no loss on the AFCO-investor loans as of 
June, 1982. In fact, Home "booked" those loans as losses only 
after the Armitage jury returned its adverse verdict in late 
1984. (Shaw, R. 2916.202). Until the Armitage verdict, Home 
reasonably expected repayment of its fully secured mortgage 
loans. Home had, however, pursuant to federal regulations, 
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begun to establish a reserve for uncollected interest so 
that such accrued interest would not be treated as income. 
(Smolka, R. 2917.28, 2916.133,-.145-.147). If Home's method of 
accounting for delinquent interest is what Aetna wanted from 
Home, it could and should have posed a question reasonably 
designed to elicit such information. Wardle v. International 
Health & Life Ins. Co.. supra at 626. Even Aetna's own agent, 
Don Bradshaw, testified that the mere establishment of a 
reserve for uncollected interest would not have deterred him 
Q 
from taking Home's Application. (R. 2916.69-.70). 
Furthermore, the chart on page 4 provides no help to 
Aetna. Assuming Question no. 17 was answered correctly, Home -
following Aetna's instructions - would not have reached page 
4. Page 4, furthermore, is merely a continuation of Question 
17, asking for additional detail - over a six-year history - of 
"losses sustained." A cursory examination of the Application, 
including the chart, shows that it was designed to elicit 
7
 Significantly, however, the Aetna Bond excludes from 
fidelity coverage uncollected interest on loans. See Rider 
6041 (If 2(i)). 
8
 In response to Aetna's "hypothetical," which was 
unsupported by evidence, Bradshaw conceded that if., in addition 
to the reserve for uncollected interest, Home had already 
decided that it "was going to make a claim related to 
dishonesty on the bond," then he would not have submitted the 
Application. (R. 2916.70-.71). The jury, however, concluded 
that any nondisclosure by Home was unintentional. 
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information about events that had already triggered a "loss" by 
any common sense definition. "Loss sustained," "date/" 
"amount," are all concepts used to get at something that has 
clearly happened and is identifiable both mathematically and by 
time. 
In its Brief, Aetna disingenuinely never even mentions the 
actual terms used in its Application. (See Aetna Brief, Point 
III). Rather, it substitutes new terms, "possible claim," 
••potential claim," and "potential loss" (Id., pp. 47, 52), 
which are entirely different legal concepts from "loss 
sustained." Aetna seems to base its entire legal argument on 
these contingent concepts, which are nowhere found in the 
Application. Aetna, in hindsight, now asserts that Home should 
have guessed that this was the information Aetna really desired 
and engaged a staff of lawyers and actuaries to divine the 
certainty of an adverse judgment which was not yet rendered 
and, as Aetna admits, did not result in a loss until three and 
one-half years later. (Aetna Brief, pp. 18, 59). No 
responsible institution would ever classify pending or 
threatened litigation as a "loss sustained." The Application 
does not request "potential claims" or "potential losses," 
opinions, judgments or speculation about future events. Had 
Aetna truly desired such information, it need only have asked 
Home simple, specific questions, such as "is there any existing 
or threatened litigation?" (See Memorandum Decision, R. 
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2078). Yet it failed to do so. Home should not be blamed for 
and suffer the consequences of Aetna's failure to inquire. See 
2 Couch on Insurance 2d § 15.90, supra; see Analysis (ambiguity 
in applications for insurance), supra at 34. 
Finally, even if it could be argued that Home should 
somehow have divined what Aetna really wanted, Robinson never 
testified that Aetna would not have issued the bond or would 
have excluded the risk. (Memorandum Dec, R. 2069-70). 
Similarly, there was no evidence that Aetna would have made 
further inquiry had Home's answer to Question No. 17 been 
different. (Id., R. 2070-2071). Having "closely reviewed the 
Bradshaw and Robinson transcripts," Judge Murphy concluded: 
[T]here was no evidentiary basis for the 
jury to determine that Aetna would not have 
issued the bond or would have excluded the 
risk if Home had responded affirmatively to 
Question 17 in accordance with the 
information it had on June 16, 1982. 
(Id., R. 2070). 
B. HOME HAD NO DUTY TO VOLUNTEER INFORMATION NOT 
REQUESTED. 
In responding to Interrogatory no. 4 the jury concluded 
that Home unintentionally failed to disclose facts beyond those 
required in response to the Application questionnaire. Because 
there is no duty to volunteer information not requested, the 
Trial Court held that the jury's answer to Interrogatory No. 4 
afforded no basis for Aetna to rescind its Bond or otherwise 
avoid coverage. (Memorandum Decision, R. 2058, 2071-2079). 
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In cases of nonmarine insurance, the prevailing American 
[I]f the insurer propounds questions to the 
applicant and he makes full and true 
answers, the applicant is not answerable for 
an omission to mention the existence of 
other facts about which no inquiry is made 
of him, although they may turn out to be 
material for the insurer to know in taking 
the risk. 
43 Am.Jur.2d. Insurance §§ 1008, 1005 (1982); accord, 9 Couch 
on Insurance § 38.72 (2d ed. 1985); R. Keeton, Cases and 
Material on Basic Insurance Law (1977) at 530. 
In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Howard, 67 F.2d 
382 (5th Cir. 1933), petition for rehearing denied, 78 L.E. 
1043, cert, denied 78 L.E. 1054 (1934), which involved a 
fidelity bond, the surety defended on the basis that the 
insured had failed to volunteer material information not 
requested in the bond application. The Court rejected the 
surety's defense: 
[T]he failure to disclose, in the absence of 
questions calling for it, was not a breach 
of the bond. [I]t would be a harsh and 
unreasonable construction of the bond, and 
contrary to the principles governing cases 
of this kind, to hold it defeated by a 
failure to furnish information not called 
for. 
67 F.2d at 383; see also State v. United Pacific Insurance Co., 
612 P.2d 809, 811 (Wash. App. 1980) (also a fidelity bond case) 
("failure to provide information not requested by the insurer 
would not vitiate the contract"). 
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The majority view set forth above, which Aetna conveniently 
fails to mention, is reiterated in numerous cases involving 
other types of insurance. See Federal Insurance Co. v. Oak 
Industries. Fed. Sec. Rptr. H 92, 519 (S.D. Cal. 1986; Civil 
No. 85-985-G(M)) (directors and officers liability policy), 
USLife Credit Life Insurance Co. v. McAfee. 630 P.2d 450, 453 
(Wash. App. 1981) (health insurance); Georgia Farm Bureau 
Insurance Co. v. First Federal Savings & Loan of Statesboro. 
262 S.E.2d 147 (Ga. App. 1979) (fire insurance); Van Winkle v. 
Transamerica Title Ins. Co.. 697 P.2d 784, 786 (Colo. App. 
1984) (title insurance); Dinnerman v. Boston Ins. Co. 181 Misc. 
703, 42 N.Y.S.2d 89 (1943) (fire insurance); accord Wootton v. 
Combined Ins. Co. of America. 16 Utah 2d 52, 395 P.2d 724 
(1964) (failure of an applicant for insurance to "volunteer" 
information not requested on an application form does not avoid 
g 
coverage.) 
9
 It is well settled that if an insurer, with all its data 
bases, resources and expertise, does not deem it necessary to 
inquire about certain information in the application 
questionnaire it composes, then the information not inquired 
into is presummed to be immaterial. Roess v. St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co.. 383 F.Supp. 1231, 1237 (M.D. Fla. 1974) 
(interpreting Florida statute substantially similar to Utah's 
former Section 31-19-8); see also. 9 Couch on Insurance 2d 
§ 38.72 (1968) (insured is entitled to presume that an 
insurance application asks all questions relevant to the 
insurer's decision to issue a policy); 43 Am.Jur.2d Insurance 
§ 1007, at 1014 (1982); USLife Credit Life Ins. Co. v. McAfee. 
supra at 453; Treit v. Oregon Automobile Ins. Co.. 499 P.2d 
335, 338 (Ore. App. 1972); Stipcich v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 
Co.. 72 L.Ed. 895, 898 (1928); Ellis v. Standard Ace. Ins. Co. 
of Detroit. Mich., 27 F.2d 544, 546 (S.D. Tex. 1928). 
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Nonetheless, Aetna seeks to impose on Home a duty to 
volunteer, citing Sumitomo Bank of Cal. v. Iwasaki, 73 Cal. 
Rptr. 564, 447 P.2d 956 (Cal. 1968); Phoenix Sav. & Loan, Inc. 
v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 266 F.Supp. 465 (D. Md. 1966) 
rev'd., 381 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1967); West American Fin. Co. v. 
Pacific Indemnity Co., 61 P.2d 963 (Cal. App. 1936). These 
authorities and those they rely upon were analyzed and rejected 
by the Trial Court (Memorandum Dec, R. 2058, 2072-2076), which 
found significant the fact that "none of the decisions 
discussed inquires made by the insurer in the application 
process." Morever, those authorities, particularly Sumitomo 
Bank, fail to acknowledge, much less analyze, the modern cases 
that refuse to impose a duty to volunteer on an insured. 
The law should not impose a duty of clairvoyance on an 
applicant for insurance. USLife Credit Life Ins. Co. v. McAfee, 
supra at 455. The undesirability of such a law and policy was 
explained by Trial Court in this case, which held: 
[T]he courts should not impose a rule 
requiring the insured be expert in risk 
assumption. The latter is the area of 
expertise of the insurer. . . . one 
situated as Home cannot be expected to 
determine what is material and what is not 
material to the vast subject matter 
underlying the particular risks assumed. 
The insurer, as the beneficiary of any duty 
imposed on the insured, should realize the 
insured's focus is on its immediate business 
and industry. The insured's focus is not on 
deliberating about the materiality or 
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immateriality to an insured risk of a vast 
amount of historical and current business 
information. Consequently, even if the 
insured is highly sophisticated and has some 
knowledge of risk assumption, it cannot be 
expected to have its attention focused on 
that about which it is not asked on an 
insurance application questionnaire. 
The court is persuaded that concerning 
subjects not probed in the application 
questionnaire, the insured does not have a 
duty to volunteer information . . . 
(Memorandum Dec., R. 2077). 
C. AETNA'S FAILURE TO TENDER PREMIUMS BACK TO HOME 
PRECLUDES RESCISSION. 
Aetna may not now claim that its Bond is Mvoid ab initio" 
because it never unequivocally elected to rescind the Bond, 
never tendered back to Home the premiums paid, but instead, 
chose to defend on the policy. 
"Rescission" is not just the termination of a contractual 
obligation. Rather, it is the "abrogation or undoing of [a 
contract] at the beginning, which seeks to create a situation 
the same as if no contract had ever existed." Glockel v. State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 400 N.W.2d 250 (Neb. 
10
 The Court did not rule on this argument, which Home 
briefed and argued below. (R. 1500, 1506-1510; 2918.58-.61). 
However, this Court can affirm the Trial Court's decision on 
legal grounds not ruled on below, where it is proper under the 
law to do so. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates, 752 P.2d 
892, 895 (Utah 1988); Tavlor v. Estate of Tavlor, 770 P.2d 163, 
170 n.10 (Utah App. 1989). 
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1987). An insurer is precluded from asserting rescission 
where, after having acquired knowledge of facts justifying 
rescission, it retains the unearned portion of the premium or 
fails to return or tender it back with reasonable promptness. 
Dairvland Ins. Co. v. Kammerer, 327 N.W.2d 618 (Neb. 1982); 
Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Anava. 428 P.2d 640, 645 
(N.M. 1967); 3A Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice § 1832 
(1967); 45 C.J.S. Insurance § 716 at 698 (1946). If a party 
elects to rescind a contract, it must act promptly and 
unequivocally. Perry v. Woodall. 438 P.2d 813 (Utah 1968); 
accord. Verex Assurance. Inc. v. John Hanson Sav. & Loan. 816 
F.2d 1296, 1302 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, in Dairvland. the 
Nebraska Supreme Court held: 
When learning of the alleged fraud. 
Auto-Owners [the insurer! had two choices. 
Either it could determine that, because of 
the alleged fraudulent statements made to 
it. it wished to cancel the policy from its 
inception and return to Popish [the insured] 
the entire premium, on the theory that the 
policy never came into existence, or it 
could waive the alleged fraud, keep the 
premium earned to date of cancellation, and 
accept responsibility under the policy. . . 
TBly its retention of a portion of the 
premium. Auto-Owners elected to recognize 
the existence of the policy from the date of 
its issuance. . . Having made that choice. 
Auto-Owners could not, on the one hand, 
recognize the existence of the policy and 
retain a portion of the premium and, on the 
other hand, deny the coverage afforded by 
the policy because of alleged fraudulent 
misrepresentation. 
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Dairyland, supra, at 620 (emphasis added); see also 44 
Am.Jur.2d Insurance § 1649 at 647 (1982). 
Utah law imposes this same choice on insurers: 
One who claims a right of recission must act 
with reasonable promptness [* * *] [A 
defendant insurance company] cannot treat 
the policy as void for the purpose of 
defense to an action to recover for a loss 
thereafter occurring, and at the same time 
treat it as valid for the purpose of earning 
and collecting further premiums. 
Farrinaton v. Granite States Fire Ins. Co. of Portsmouth, 232 
P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1951) (quoting 25 Am.Jur. 653). One who 
wishes to claim that a contract was void .at) initio must tender 
back to the other contracting party the consideration it 
received. Perry v. Woodall, supra at 815. Failure to do so 
results in loss of the right to rescind. Id. at 815. 
Aetna never clearly elected rescission. It acknowledged 
that it never tendered back to Home the premiums Home paid 
Aetna to purchase the Bond. (R. 2918.85-.86). As in Dairyland 
and the authorities cited above, Aetna has lost this defense. 
It would be fundamentally unfair to allow Aetna to watch the 
events of the last seven and one-half years unfold, retain the 
benefits of the Bond and then later claim the right to rescind 
it. See McLane v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 432 P.2d 98 
(Mont. 1967) (Montana's rescission statute - rescission not 
available where insurer continued to accept premiums after 
acquiring knowledge of its right to rescind). Having kept the 
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premiums, having defended on the basis of the Bond's 
provisions/ Aetna should not be heard to argue that its Bond 
was void from its inception. 
When confronted below with its failure to tender, Aetna 
argued that Berger v. Minnesota Mutual Life Ins. Co,, 723 P.2d 
388 (Utah 1986)/ says nothing about tender of premiums as a 
prerequisite to rescission. Berger does not mention necessity 
of tender because the question of tender was not in issue 
there. Indeed/ unlike Aetna, Minnesota Mutual immediately 
tendered back to the insured the premium he had paid. See 
Minnesota Mutual's Answer, Third Defense (R. 3549/ 3553). 
Aetna also argued that coverage may be avoided under Utah 
Code Ann. § 31-19-8 (since repealed) without electing 
rescission. (R. 1672# 1679-1682). This argument ignores that 
the term rescission is used in § 31-19-8 and that elsewhere it 
has been described as a "rescission statute". See State 
Compensation Fund v. Mar Pac Helicopter Corp, 752 P.2d 1, 5 
(Ariz. App. 1987) (interp. A.R.S. § 20-1109). While Section 
31-19-8 may allow an insurer to avoid its contractual 
obligations under certain circumstances/ it does not alter the 
mechanics of doing so or change the well-settled law of 
rescission. 
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D. THE TRIAL COURT WAS FREE TO DISREGARD THE JURY'S 
ADVISORY FINDINGS ON INTERROGATORIES NOS. 2 AND 4. 
Aetna and Home entered into a contract whereby Aetna agreed 
to indemnify Home for certain losses. In asserting in its 
Answer that the Bond was void ah initio, Aetna sought to 
rescind its contract. As the Utah Supreme Court recently held 
in Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987), an action 
for rescission is a claim for equitable relief. Accordingly, 
Aetna was not entitled to a jury trial on the issues 
surrounding its claim of rescission. Id. at n. 6. In a 
proceeding in equity, a jury fills only an advisory role. 
Thus, a Trial Court is free to accept or reject the finding of 
an advisory jury and the Trial Court's decision in that regard 
is not subject to appellate review. Romrell v. Zions First 
National Bank, 611 P.2d 392, 394 (Utah 1980) (trial judge may 
of course completely reject the verdict of an advisory jury in 
an equity case). 
In this case, placed under a compaction of time, the severe 
pressures of a long and drawn-out trial and the belated 
assertion by Aetna of its rescission defense, the Court drafted 
its own special interrogatories and chose to submit everything 
to the jury and "sort it out later." Thereafter, "without the 
pressure of a jury waiting in the wings" and armed with actual 
transcripts of "pertinent portions of the trial," the Court 
considered Aetna's equitable defense in connection with Aetna's 
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request for entry of judgment and Home's corresponding motion. 
The Trial Court found that there were no misrepresentations or 
omissions by Home of material facts requested by the 
Application and disregarded the contrary advisory finding. The 
care with which the Court considered this issue, its fact 
finding and reasoning are set forth in detail in its Memorandum 
Decision. (R. 2058/ 2066-2071). The Trial Court's decision to 
deny Aetna's request for equitable relief "follows logically 
from and is supported by the evidence. M Smith v. Smith, 726 
P.2d 423/ 426 (Utah 1986). Aetna has not even suggested that 
the Trial Court's findings were clearly erroneous. See Utah R. 
Civ. P. 52(a). -Aetna has no legal basis to challenge the 
Court's rejection of its defense and refusal to fashion the 
equitable relief it belatedly sought. 
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POINT IV 
AETNA MAY NOT USE THE TRADING EXCLUSION RIDER TO AVOID 
PAYING HOME'S LOSSES. 
Prior to trial, Aetna moved for summary judgment based upon 
Bond Rider 6030a. (R. 194-195)• This rider purports to 
exclude coverage which might otherwise obtain for "losses 
resulting directly or indirectly from trading.- After Judge 
Murphy denied Aetna's motion, noting that Home's conduct "does 
not necessarily equate to trading in securities as that term is 
used in Rider SR 6030a" (Minute Entry, R. 329-332), Aetna 
completely abandoned this defense. Indeed, Aetna failed to 
mention or preserve this defense in the Stipulated Pretrial 
Order (R. 719-740); it put on no evidence relevant to the issue 
during the course of trial; and it proposed no Jury 
Instructions or requests for findings in the Special Verdict 
pertinent to the issue (R. 1180-1289). 
Having consciously relinquished this purported affirmative 
defense, Aetna incredibly requests a remand for a factual 
determination "of that portion of Home Savings' losses in the 
Armitaoe judgment which derived from trading . . . " and a 
proportionate reduction of Home's damages. (Brief, p. 61). 
This relief is simply unavailable to Aetna. 
A. AETNA HAS WAIVED THE TRADING EXCLUSION DEFENSE AND ANY 
ALLEGED ERROR RELATING TO ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
Although Aetna's "trading exclusion" argument is in the 
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nature of an affirmative defense, Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c); Pratt 
v. Board of Education, 564 P.2d 294, 298 (Utah 1977), Aetna 
failed to raise it in its Answer. (R. 44-53). Nevertheless, 
Aetna moved for summary judgment based on this exclusion. (R. 
194-195). Home could have objected to the motion, but instead 
addressed its lack of merit. (R. 287-288.23, 2912.61-.66). 
Based on the record then before it, the Court denied Aetna's 
motion (Minute Entry, R. 329-332); it did not, however, 
preclude Aetna from reasserting the defense in the pretrial 
order or from introducing evidence on the issue at trial. (R. 
329, 331). 
After the Court denied Aetna's motion, Aetna stipulated to 
a pretrial order. In the Stipulated Pretrial Order, Aetna set 
forth its theory of the case and reserved certain defenses to 
Home's claims. (R. 719-740). Nowhere in the Pretrial Order or 
elsewhere did Aetna preserve the "trading exclusion" defense. 
Once a pretrial order is signed and entered, it thereafter 
limits and controls the issues in the litigation. Citizens 
Casualty Co. of New York v. Hackett, 410 P.2d 767, 768 (Utah 
1966). Issues not retained in the pretrial order are 
eliminated from the action. Baxter v. Utah Dept. of 
Transportation, 783 P.2d 1045, 1047 n. 2 (Utah App. 1989); 
Pierce County Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Health 
Trust v. Elks Lodge, B.P.O.E. NO. 1450, 827 F.2d 1324, 1329 
(9th Cir. 1987). Aetna's failure to include this issue in the 
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pretrial order effects a waiver of the issue and it is 
irrelevant that the issue may have been debated or discussed 
prior to entry of the pretrial order. Southern California 
Retail Clerks Union and Food Employers Joint Pension Trust Fund 
v, Biorklund, 728 F.2d 1262, 1264 (9th Cir. 1984); accord, 
Rumsev v. Salt Lake City. 400 P.2d 205, 206 (Utah 1965) 
(affirmative defense abandoned at pretrial hearing)., 
Moreover, the relief which Aetna seeks on appeal is remand 
for a factual determination as to what HportionM of Home's 
losses resulted from -trading- and a corresponding 
••proportionate" reduction in damages. (Aetna Brief, p. 61). 
Interestingly, this is not the relief Aetna sought when it 
moved for summary judgment. (R. 194-195, 210-210.87). 
Thereafter, Aetna abandoned the defense. No evidence was ever 
presented to the Court, or to the jury, that would support the 
relief Aetna now seeks. As this Court recently held in Barker 
v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548, 553-54 (Utah App. 1987), where a 
party fails to present evidence on an issue at trial he may not 
obtain a remand to later allow him to present such evidence. 
Thus, where, as here, no evidence was presented or findings 
requested, remand for a factual determination as to whether 
certain of Home's losses resulted from -trading- is both 
unwarranted and unavailable. 
1 1
 Aetna, by its motion, sought to exclude the entirety of 
Home Savings' loss from coverage. There was no request for a 
-proportionate reduction-. 
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B. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DECIDED AETNA'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
Home agrees that the trading loss exclusion was meant to 
exclude losses caused by trading in securities. However, there 
is no evidence that Aetna can point to in the record, in 
connection with its motion for summary judgment or otherwise, 
that Home was involved in "trading," as that term is defined 
with respect to securities or as it is vaguely used in Rider 
6030a. 
The wording of the "trading exclusion" rider, as used in 
Bankers1 and Savings & Loans' Blanket Bonds, was borrowed from 
the standard Brokers' Blanket Bond. Shearson/American Express 
v. First Continental Bank & Trust, 579 F.Supp. 1305, 1310 (W.D. 
Mo. 1984). In the securities industry, "trading" denotes 
carrying out transactions of buying or selling stocks, bonds or 
commodity futures contracts. Downes, Barron's Dictionary of 
Finance and Investment Terms (1985) at 439. It is this type of 
activity, new to the highly regulated banking industry, that 
12 the imported rider intended to exclude from coverage. 
1 2
 According to one source, the addition of the "trading 
exclusion" rider to the Standard Bankers Blanket Bond was 
prompted in the mid-1970's by "unprecedented bank activity in 
the area of foreign exchange trading" and "the large amounts of 
funds involved" therein. Thus, effective 1976, the "trading" 
exclusion from the Standard Stockbrokers Blanket Bond was 
inserted into the Standard Bankers Blanket Bond, with a 
buy-back option exercisable by institutions engaged in such 
trading activity. R. Weldy, "A Survey of Recent Changes in 
Financial Institution Bonds," Forum at 270 (Fall, 1976). 
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Shearson/American Express, supra; Aetna Brief, p.58. Yet, as 
Judge Kane, the trial judge in Armitaae explained, "This action 
arose from the fraudulent business activities of three Afco 
corporations and their president • . . . Investors were 
beguiled into taking out second mortgages on their homes in 
order to purchase worthless securities from Afco and Affleck." 
City Consumer Services, Inc. v. Home, 631 F. Supp. 1050, 
1051-52 (D. Utah 1986) (emphasis added) (also R. 2800-2822). 
The Armitaqe jury was instructed that promissory notes given by 
AFCO to the Armitage plaintiffs/AFCO-investors were, as a 
matter of law, securities. Armitaae Jury Instruction No. 5.03 
(R. 288.12). . However, there was no such instruction and no 
such finding with respect to the second mortgage loans that 
originated at Home Savings. Judge Kane, in fact, instructed 
the jury that the notes and loan documents executed by the 
borrowers in favor of Home Savings, as a matter of law, were 
not securities. Armitaae Jury Instruction 5.03 (R. 288.12). 
Thus, while Home's participation, through the involvement of 
its loan officer Larry Glad, see Armitaae Jury Instruction 
10.08 (R. 288.13), resulted in the Jury finding violations of 
certain securities laws, there was no finding in Armitaae that 
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13 Home Savings was "trading- in securities. On the contrary, 
Home Savings was engaged in the same business it had conducted 
since its inception, making mortgage loans to homeowners. 
Accordingly, after carefully considering Aetna's motion and 
memorandum, together with the instructions given in Armitage 
and the outcome of the Armitage lawsuit, Judge Murphy denied 
Aetna's motion for summary judgment. The Court's analytical 
opinion reasoned: 
. . .Defendant's position is necessarily and 
expressly that plaintiff's alleged loss 
arises out of the judgment in Armitage, et 
al v. Home Savings and Loan Association, 
which was based on a jury finding against 
Home for fraud "involved in the sale or 
exchange of securities." The nature of the 
evidence, jury instructions and verdict in 
Armitage necessarily requires the 
nomenclature "involved in the sale or 
exchange of securities" to characterize 
Home's conduct and the jury's findings. 
Such "involvement," however, does not 
necessarily equate to "trading" in 
securities as that term is used in rider SR 
6030a. 
13 Aetna's reliance on the Armitage verdict and judgment 
impermissibly short-cuts the requirements necessary to 
establish collateral estoppel. To establish issue preclusion 
requires, first, that the factual issue decided in the prior 
adjudication be identical in all respects with the one 
presented in the action in question. Copper State Thrift & 
Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 390 (Utah App. 1987); Searle 
Brothers v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978). Yet, the 
factual issues of whether Home engaged in "trading" as that 
term is used in Rider 6030a, and whether Home sustained a loss 
caused by "trading" were never determined in Armitage. Judge 
Murphy implicitly noted this distinction in his order denying 
Aetna's motion for summary judgment. (R. 329-332). 
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The jury's affirmative answer to question 
A.l. in the verdict form necessarilyrequired 
a finding that Home offered or sold a 
security. Jury instruction 6.03, however, 
required such a finding if Home's 
"assistance was a substantial motivating 
factor in causing the sale of a 
security..." Such a finding is not 
necessarily the eguivalent of a finding that 
Home or any employee was "trading" in 
securities. These same concepts apply to 
the jury finding under Section 
61-1-22(1)(a), Utah Code Ann., pursuant to 
jury instruction Nos. 8.01, 8.02, 8.03, 8.07 
and 8.08, and recorded in response to 
question C.l. in the verdict form. Under 
these particular securities claims, if Home 
facilitated the sale of a security, it was 
itself a seller. Facilitation of a sale may 
constitute a sale under various securities 
statutes, but it does not necessarily 
constitute trading in securities as that 
term is used in rider SR 6030a. 
The Jury finding of primary liability under 
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 
did not require a finding that Home was a 
seller of a security. This finding was 
premised on an inherent finding of the 
proscribed acts "in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security." Such a 
finding is not necessarily the equivalent of 
a finding that Home traded securities. 
The undisputed facts submitted in support of 
defendant's motion establish that trading in 
securities, if any, occurred at the level 
between AFCO and the investor. These same 
facts do not, however, establish as a matter 
of law that Home was trading in securities. 
14 (Minute Entry, R. 329-331) (emphasis added). 
1 4
 Judge Murphy also found the exclusion's term "trading," 
as used in Rider 6030a, to be ambiguous. (R. 331). The 
ambiguity, therefore, must be strictly construed against Aetna, 
in favor of coverage. 
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Aetna's simplistic conclusion that any securities fraud 
judgment against Home could not have been entered without a 
finding of -trading- is contrary to both the evidence (or lack 
thereof) and the law. In fact, Aetna presented no evidence 
that Home Savings was engaged in -trading-; and -trading- is 
not a specific element of any of the securities claims made in 
Armitage. Aetna's interpretation could, in practice, exclude 
from coverage losses on any loan that involved fraud or 
dishonesty, if made to a borrower who then invested, with the 
bank's knowledge, the proceeds of that loan in a -security," as 
that term is broadly construed under various state and federal 
securities laws. 
Indeed, Aetna's contention that any securities context will 
invoke the trading exclusion has been specifically rejected. 
In Index Fund, Inc. v. Insurance Company of North America, 580 
F.2d 1158 (2d Cir. 1978), cert, denied 440 U.S. 912 (1979) 
(involving a fidelity bond), INA sought to exclude coverage for 
losses caused by the plaintiff's president, who was bribed to 
purchase and sell securities on behalf of his corporation at 
inflated prices. In Index Fund, the jury was instructed that 
if it found that the losses were caused by fraudulent or 
dishonest acts which did not result from trading, that it must 
determine the amount of Index Fund's loss. Unlike the present 
case, in Index Fund the jury actually made such a factual 
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finding. However, the Trial Court entered judgment 
notwithstanding the jury's verdict for INA. On appeal, the 
Second Circuit, in overruling the Trial Court's Judgment 
N.O.V., noted "where, as here, the obligee is a regulated 
investment company, rather than a broker, fraudulent purchases 
of securities for the company by the covered employee at a 
manipulated price may well be considered outside the 
contemplated meaning of 'trading'." Id. at 1162 (emphasis 
added). 
Even more recently, in Insurance Company of North America 
v. Gibralco, Inc., 847 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth 
Circuit held that a trading loss exclusion similar to the 
instant one was inapplicable, despite trading at some point in 
furtherance of an employee's scheme to embezzle and steal 
bonds. The insurer, again INA, argued that if trading occurred 
at any point in furtherance of the employee's scheme, then the 
trading loss exclusion precluded coverage. In rejecting this 
argument, the court explained: 
"Trading losses are generally understood to 
be market losses sustained by firms as a 
result of ill-advised, unauthorized, or 
simply unlucky trading decisions made in the 
purchasing, selling, or trading in 
securities . . . 
* * * * * 
We do not agree with INA that the trading 
loss exclusion precludes coverage if a trade 
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occurs anywhere in the chain of events 
resulting in a loss to the insured. The 
broad applicability of the trading loss 
exclusion urged by INA would eviscerate the 
employee dishonesty coverage provisions of 
the Bond in every case where trade might 
occur in the course of an employee's 
dishonest scheme. 
Id. at 533. 
Because the loss in Gibralco was caused by dishonesty and 
fraudulent conduct/ as is the case here, as opposed to trading, 
the Court of Appeals directed that judgment be entered against 
15 INA. This same result should obtain with respect to Home's 
losses caused by the dishonest and fraudulent acts of Larry 
Glad. 
The Trial Court properly rejected Aetna's "trading" 
argument/ as presented on Aetna's motion for summary judgment. 
15
 Like Judge Murphy, the Gibralco Court further found that 
the language of the trading loss exclusion was ambiguous: ("the 
Bond was ambiguous with respect to losses involving both 
trading and employee dishonesty."). 847 F.2d at 533-34. As in 
Gibralco, this provision should be construed against the 
insurer and in favor of coverage. 
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POINT V. 
NO BASIS EXISTS FOR AETNA'S CLAIMS THAT THE JURY WAS 
IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED AND THAT AETNA WAS PREJUDICED IN 
SUBMITTING ITS THEORY OF THE CASE. 
In Point V of its Brief, Aetna complains that the Court 
misled and confused the jury by the instructions on causation 
and the Special Verdict form submitted to the jury. Seeking a 
retrial, Aetna claims it somehow was not permitted to argue its 
theory of the case. For Aetna to prevail on this issue, it 
must establish: (1) that it properly preserved the objections 
raised on appeal; (2) that the objections raised are in accord 
with the law; and (3) that any error prejudiced Aetna. As set: 
forth below, Aetna cannot meet its burden. 
A. AETNA HAS NOT EFFECTIVELY PRESERVED THE ALLEGED ERROR. 
Aetna asserts that the Court erred: (1) by refusing to read 
"a number of key instructions"; (2) by giving jury instructions 
••that inaccurately presented Aetna's defense"; (3) by refusing 
to submit to the jury a single special verdict question; and 
(4) by submitting to the jury a special verdict form which 
"failed to mention Home Savings* officers' and directors' 
actions as being a possible cause of Home Savings' loss." 
Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that, "No 
party may assign as error the giving or failure to give an 
instruction unless he objects thereto." Thus, failure to 
object is deemed a waiver on appeal. VanDyke v. Mountain Coin 
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Machine Distributors, 758 P.2d 962, 964 (Utah App. 1988). 
Furthermore, "a party must state distinctly the matter to which 
he objects and the grounds for his objection." Utah R. Civ. P. 
51. The grounds stated as the basis for an objection must be 
specific enough to give the Trial Court an opportunity to 
correct the error, if appropriate, and must alert the Court to 
the very objection that is later made the basis for appeal. 
Id.; Employers1 Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Allen Oil Co., 258 
P.2d 445, 450 (Utah 1953). Otherwise, the objection will not 
be considered on appeal. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake 
Citv v. Barrutia, 526 P.2d 47, 51 (Utah 1974). 
(1) Aetna's proposed instructions. 
The "number of key instructions" requested by Aetna that 
the Court, over Aetna's objection, refused to give were just 
two (R. 2917.59, 2917.63-.64). The first, proposed Instruction 
No. 2 (R. 1227), stated in relevant part: 
. . . .If you find that the losses sustained 
by Home Savings were solely and proximately 
caused by Home Savings' own mismanagement, 
misfeasance or other negligence and/or 
failure to follow safe and sound lending 
practices, then you must find there is no 
coverage for Home Savings under the bond. 
Aetna's stated ground for giving this instruction was 
unintelligible. The entire stated basis was: 
MR. DAVIES: All right. First of all, our 
defense that pertains to mismanagement as we 
have discussed before, we have objected of 
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course to the refusal to give requested 
Instruction number two, 
(R. 2917.59). This objection patently fails the specificity 
test established by Rule 51. Thus, the objection, whatever it 
was, has been waived. 
Aetna's proposed Instruction No. 42 (R. 1196) addressed the 
possibility of concurrent causes, and sought to instruct the 
jury that if it found certain of Home Savings' conduct to be "a 
primary contributing cause to" Home's loss, then the loss could 
not have been caused by Glad's dishonest acts. Because the 
Court asked for clarification of Instruction No. 42, there is 
somewhat more of an explanation on the record. (R. 2917.63). 
However, the explanation offered does not correspond to the 
language of the requested instruction or the alleged error. 
MR. DAVIES: . . . And finally, on the 
court's refusal to give instruction number 
forty-two regarding causation, that was our 
causation defense, and I think that's been 
argued before. 
THE COURT: You mean that 
MR. DAVIES: That Home Savings' 
mismanagement and other improper decisions 
and conduct could be a separate cause — 
THE COURT: Measured by the same standard of 
proof, that is, a preponderance, and not 
requiring you to show fraud or bad faith? 
MR. DAVIES: That would be our position. 
That's correct, Your Honor. And we only 
request preponderance. 
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(R. 2917.63-.64; emphasis added). The objection urges that 
Home's alleged mismanagement could be a "separate cause" of its 
loss. The proposed Instruction, on the other hand/ speaks of 
"primary contributing cause/ not "separate cause/" as Aetna's 
counsel explained. The two are different concepts. If the 
objection was intended to be that a "primary contributing 
cause," whatever that is, breaks the chain of causation, then 
the basis for the instruction was not made known to the Court. 
Where the ground stated does not draw attention to the alleged 
error claimed on appeal/ as was the case here, then the alleged 
error is not preserved for appeal. VanDyke v. Mountain Coin 
Machine Distributors, supra at 964; Employers' Mutual Liability 
Ins. Co. v. Allen Oil Co., supra at 450. 
More importantly, neither proposed instruction addresses 
the alleged error Aetna now raises on appeal: that the jury 
was not permitted to "apportion fault" between competing causes 
(Glad's dishonesty versus Home Savings' alleged 
mismanagement). Aetna proposed an erroneous comparative fault 
instruction (see Aetna's proposed Instruction no. 3, R. 1224, 
1228)/ which the Court correctly declined to give. Aetna did 
not object. Consequently/ the very issue which Aetna asserts 
as error was not preserved for appeal. 
(2) Jury Instructions 26-30. 
Aetna also now complains that Instructions nos. 26/ 27, 28, 
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29 and 30, "inaccurately presented [its] defense." (Aetna 
Brief, p. 69). Aetna, however, did not object to four of the 
five instructions, nos. 26, 27, 28 or 30. (R. 2917.58-.70). 
Having not objected to these four instructions, Aetna waived 
its right to now claim that they were given in error. Van Dyke 
v. Mountain Coin Machine Distributors, supra at 964. 
(3) Absence of a single inquiry in the Special Verdict. 
Aetna further asserts as error the Court's failure to 
submit a Special Verdict form to the jury with the question: 
6. Did any loss sustained by Home Savings 
directly result from the mismanagement, 
misconduct, negligence, and/or failure 
to follow safe and sound lending 
practices? 
Although Aetna originally submitted a form that contained 
this question among others, that form was not used. 
Thereafter, Aetna never objected to the absence of question no. 
6 or one like it. (See parties' objections, R. 2917.57-.70). 
The special verdict form ultimately used was prepared by Aetna 
(R. 1189, 1203-1206) and submitted by Aetna to the Trial Court 
without a no. 6 like instruction. In so doing and having not 
objected to the Special Verdict form submitted to the jury, 
Aetna waived its right to assert error on appeal. Cambelt 
Int'l. Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 1241 (Utah 1987). 
(4) The Court's use of the Special Verdict form (which 
Aetna prepared.) 
Finally, Aetna brands the form of Special Verdict that the 
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Court used (R. 1290-1293) as "restrictive" and charges that it, 
in combination with the Instructions, "confused" the jury. 
(Aetna Brief, p. 72). Yet this was the very same form Aetna 
submitted to and proposed that the Court use (see R. 1189, 
1203-1206), except that the Court added a question on 
mitigation of damages. Aetna also neglects to inform the Court 
that it failed to object to the alleged restrictiveness of 
"its" form, or to the wording of any particular questions 
contained therein. By not objecting, any alleged error has 
been waived. Cambelt Int'l. Corp. v. Dalton, supra. 
B. THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY. 
Aetna's indictment of the Court's handling of instructions 
appears to be (1) that the jury should have been allowed to 
speculate whether better policies and procedures, had they been 
in place, might have checked Glad's dishonest conduct and thus 
prevented Home's loss; and (2) that the instructions and 
Special Verdict form should have permitted the jury to 
"apportion" causation. 
(1) Negligence is not a defense to a fidelity bond claim. 
Instruction no. 29, given to the jury, advised that: 
. . . negligence resulting from the 
existence of inadequate policies and 
procedures at Home Savings, or the failure 
to follow policies and procedures then in 
place at Home Savings, is not a defense if 
the conclusion drawn therefrom is that 
better policies and procedures or adherence 
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thereto would have checked the dishonesty, 
if any, of Larry Glad and prevented a loss 
that otherwise would have occurred. 
(Quoted in part, R. 1330). 
At page 70 of its Brief, Aetna challenges the Court's 
decision to give Instruction No. 29 and asserts that the jury 
should have been allowed to consider whether -better policies 
and procedures thereto would have checked the dishonesty, if 
any, of Larry Glad and prevented a loss that otherwise would 
have occurred.** Negligence, however, whether in the form of 
failure to have in place better procedures, failure to follow 
existing procedures, failure to adequately supervise employees, 
negligence in hiring, or mismanagement in general, is not a 
defense available to Aetna under its Bond. 
Aetna's Bond, Rider 6041, provides simply that Aetna agrees 
to indemnify an insured for "Loss resulting directly from one 
or more dishonest or fraudulent acts of an Employee . . . " See 
Instruction no. 23 (R. 1324). Aetna, in issuing its Bond, thus 
undertook the obligation to indemnify Home against loss 
resulting directly from the dishonesty of one or more of its 
employees. The consideration for undertaking this obligation 
was the premium charged Home. Aetna required nothing further 
of Home. It did not require as a condition precedent to 
indemnification, for example, that Home adopt or follow any 
particular procedure for processing and closing loans. It did 
not require any special or particular supervision over 
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employees. In contrast to some other types of insurance (e.g., 
legal malpractice policies), it did not require the institution 
of or adherence to any particular internal quality - control 
procedures. 
Unless there exists a specific provision in a fidelity bond 
to the contrary, negligence is not a defense to an insurer's 
obligation under its bond. 13 Couch on Insurance 2d § 46.233 
(1982); 10A Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice § 801(b) (1946) 
at 849; First Hayes Banshares, Inc. v. Kansas Bankers Surety 
Co., 769 P.2d 1184, 1193 (Kan. 1989); Arlington Trust Co. v. 
Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 301 F.Supp. 854 (E.D. Va. 1969); 
Main v. Benjamin Foster Co., 192 So. 602, 603-5 (Fla. 1939); 
American Employer's Ins. Co. v. Cable, 108 F.2d 225, 227 (5th 
Cir. 1939); Maryland Casualty Co. v. American Trust Co., 71 
F.2d 137, 139 (5th Cir. 1935)(Mconstant and sleepless 
vigilence- by an employer to prevent loss to its insurer is not 
part of the consideration extracted as a condition to the 
insurer's obligation to indemnify loss caused by employee 
dishonesty); Lassetter v. Becker, 224 P. 810, 812 (Ariz. 
1924). Thus, 
[A surety is] not released from liability by 
the want of even ordinary prudence on the 
part of the insured in lessening the risk, 
unless he expressly stipulate[s] therefor. 
10A Appleman, supra § 6198 at 382. 
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In Arlington Trust Co, v. Hawkeve-Security Ins, Co., supra, 
for example, an insurer sought to escape liability under a 
fidelity bond on the ground that its insured was 
"contributorily negligent" in not adequately supervising a 
particular (dishonest) employee and in not setting up proper 
accounting and bookkeeping procedures. The Court rejected the 
insurer's defense: 
The bank admittedly relied upon the 
experience/ integrity and honesty of Mr. 
Darcey in reporting his activities to the 
Board of Directors and Executive Committee. 
They set up no special procedures to check 
or audit his work. Although the end result 
proved them wrong in not doing so, it is not 
enough to establish contributory negligence 
on the part of the bank. Negligence on the 
part of the bank/ if found to exist, is not 
sufficient to defeat recovery under the 
fidelity bond in question. 
Id. at 858; see also Main v. Benjamin Foster Co., supra. 
Instruction no. 29 was based on the above authorities and 
correctly stated the law. Thus# the Court did not err in 
giving it. In fact/ prior to trial/ Aetna acknowledged to the 
Trial Court that negligence of an employer/ in failing to 
reduce the risk of loss through better management/oversight 
procedures, was not a defense. (R. 517.4) 
(2) Apportionment based on comparative fault. 
Aetna contends the jury should have been permitted "to 
apportion cause between Larry Glad's dishonesty and Home's own 
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mismanagement and bad business judgment." (Aetna Brief, p. 
72). The argument, presumably, is that the jury should have 
engaged in some sort of "comparative fault" analysis and that 
the Court should have reduced Home's damages by the percentage 
of fault attributed to its alleged mismanagement/bad business 
judgment. 
As a preliminary matter, Aetna, as noted above, has failed 
to preserve this claimed error for review on appeal. Moreover, 
because negligence is not a defense, it cannot be the basis for 
apportionment. Under Rider 6041, the question of fact to be 
determined by the jury is simply whether the employee's conduct 
in any way brought about the loss. 
A similar comparative-fault defense was rejected in State 
v. United Pacific Ins. Co.. 612 P.2d 809, 811 (Wash. App. 
1980). The Trial Court had held that the insured was entitled 
to indemnification for only half its loss, on the basis of 
comparative negligence principles. The Court of Appeals 
reversed, holding that: 
[W]e find no authority which would permit 
the use of comparative negligence principles 
to reduce the amount of recovery owing under 
an insurance contract. Negligence is not 
defense to an action on an indemnity bond 
unless it amounts to fraud or bad faith. 10 
J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice 
§ 6198 (1943). The trial court erred in 
reducing the judgment by 50 percent on the 
theory that the School District contributed 
to its own loss. 
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For a fidelity insurer to avoid coverage on grounds of 
negligence or Hmismanagement,M it should have to show that the 
Insured's losses would have occurred notwithstanding the 
employee's dishonest conduct. J.R. Norton Company v. Fireman's 
Fund Ins. Co., supra at 860. Before trial, in response to 
Home's motion in limine to exclude testimony directed at 
negligence/mismanagement/ Aetna agreed: 
Aetna is simply contending that the 
mismanagement (negligent or otherwise) by 
Home's officers and directors constitutes 
wrongdoing quite independent of any action 
taken by Mr. Glad, and that such 
mismanagement (on the part of the officers 
and directors) is the sufficient and sole 
cause of the losses Home has sustained. 
* * * * * 
Aetna's claim is that the independent acts 
of the Home officers and directors comprise 
the sole sufficient cause of the loss 
sustained by Home . . . 
Aetna's Memorandum in Opposition to Home's Second Motion In 
Limine. (Emphases added; R. 517.l,-.3-.5). This is, in fact, 
precisely the standard the Court permitted Aetna to argue to 
the jury, and which Aetna in fact argued. Consistent with 
1 6
 Corbin indicates that where there exists multiple direct 
causes of damages, the party experiencing damages is entitled 
to his remedy under his contract, or damages for breach of his 
contract. Thus, it is generally not proper to apportion 
damages among contributing factors causing injury, 5 Corbin on 
Contracts § 999 (1964). 
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Aetna's pretrial acknowledgement, the jury was properly 
instructed on the issue of causation. 
Aetna now seeks some sort of apportionment, relying on 
Fidelity Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Corp., 440 
F.Supp. 862 (N.D. Cal. 1977); aff'd, 647 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 
1981)/ a case involving an insuring clause not contained in the 
Aetna Bond issued to Home Savings. There, the insurer agreed 
to indemnify the insured for loss of property through fraud or 
dishonesty of any person, whether or not an employee of the 
insured. 440 F.Supp. at 865. The insureds had deposited funds 
at another bank, San Francisco National Bank (MSFNBM), that 
subsequently failed. The insureds claimed that SFNB's 
President had, by dishonest design, steered SFNB into a 
substantial number of loans which later defaulted, which the 
insureds contended caused SFNB to fail and, in turn, caused 
them to lose their money on deposit. Because SFNB's failure 
could not be attributed solely to dishonestly made loans, the 
Court utilized a fact-finding procedure which distinguished 
between losses on loans that resulted from the President's 
dishonesty and losses on loans which did not result from 
dishonest conduct. 647 F.2d at 936. 
In the instant case the jury engaged in equivalent 
fact-finding. The jury was asked to decide whether Home's 
losses, with respect to each of thirtv-six loans, resulted from 
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Larry Glad's dishonest conduct. (Special Verdict, R. 
1290-1293)• Despite Aetna's closing argument that Home's 
losses were exclusively the result of its own mismanagement, 
the jury found that losses on 34 of the 36 loans resulted 
directly from Glad's dishonest acts. By implication, the jury 
found that losses on two of the loans resulted from a cause 
independent of Glad's conduct. There is no basis under the law 
of insurance contracts for any other kind of apportionment, 
particularly an apportionment between concurring causes. 
C. AETNA WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY ANY ALLEGED ERROR. 
Finally, Aetna has failed to demonstrate that it was 
somehow prejudiced. The instructions given were adequate and 
accurately set forth the law. The Jury Instructions that were 
given on causation, nos. 22, 23, 25 and 26 (none of which Aetna 
objected to), clearly permitted Aetna to argue its 
"mismanagement as a sole, sufficient cause" theory. As its 
Brief suggests, Aetna spent days presenting expert witnesses 
who, with the benefit of hindsight, second-guessed virtually 
every act and decision made by every officer and employee of 
Home Savings (except Larry Glad). See testimony of D. 
McEachren (R. 2922.4); E. Weis (R. 2904.64); J. Croft (R. 
2923.110); T. Walker (R. 2923.24); Frank Stuart (R. 2915.81); 
R. Westergard (R. 2910.18). Aetna, in fact, argued its theory 
to the jury in closing argument. (R. 2917.180-.191, .198-.206, 
.225-.226) . 
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Nonetheless, Aetna contends that the instructions 
"confused" the jury. (Aetna Brief, pp. 72, 71). To buttress 
this speculative assertion, Aetna points to certain juror 
17 
affidavits which it prepared. The Trial Court ordered 
these Affidavits stricken. (Order, R. 2434-2438). Thus, they 
should not be given any consideration on appeal. Belden v. 
Dalbo, Inc., 752 P.2d 1317 (Utah App. 1988). Even so, the 
issue is not whether the jury was confused, but rather the 
source of the confusion. 
Many factors extrinsic to the propriety of instructions can 
account for confusion. Only confusion resulting from 
prejudicial Trial Court error should be corrected. Here, there 
was no such error. In light of the substantial evidence 
supporting the jury's verdict in favor of Home Savings, which 
18 Aetna does not challenge, Aetna's request for retrial 
should be denied. 
1 7
 Paradoxically, Aetna solicited these affidavits after it 
had argued that procurement and use of juror affidavits after 
trial for any purpose was manifestly improper. (R. 
1740-1748). Home had earlier submitted the jury foreman's 
affidavit (R. 1731) to explain the jury's answers to special 
interrogatories nos. 2 and 4. However, it was stricken along 
with those Aetna submitted. 
1B
 Aetna devotes eight full pages of its Brief (p. 62-70) 
selectively summarizing the evidence it believes supported its 
alternative cause theory of mismanagement. The implication is 
that the evidence supported a verdict other than that which the 
jury rendered. Yet Aetna obviously has made no effort 
whatsoever to marshall any of the substantial evidence 
supporting the jury's verdict. Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 
766, 769 (Utah 1985). 
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POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO 
EITHER DISMISS HOME§S COMPLAINT OR REQUIRE JOINDER OF F&D 
OF MARYLAND. 
Prior to trial, Aetna moved to dismiss Home Savings' 
Complaint on the ground that Home had failed to join an 
indispensable party. By a detailed three page minute entry 
dated May 29, 1987, the Trial Court found that Home's prior 
blanket bond insurer, F&D of Maryland, was not an indispensable 
party to this action. (Minute Entry, R. 143-145). Included 
among the Trial Court's specific findings, set forth in seven 
separately numbered paragraphs, were: (1) complete relief could 
be accorded those already parties, even in the abscmce of F&D; 
(2) F&D need not be present as a party in order for the court 
to determine whether Aetna's coverage, if any, was primary or 
excess; (3) disposition of the action in F&D's absence would 
not impair or impede F&D's ability to protect itself; (4) 
liability in the case was not shared between Aetna and F&D; (5) 
Aetna was not subject to a risk of incurring double or multiple 
obligations by reason of F&D's absence; (6) judicial economy 
was not a factor; (7) within reason a plaintiff is entitled to 
proceed against the parties it chooses, which in this case did 
not include F&D; (8) there was a risk that joinder of F&D might 
result in removal to federal court, upsetting the choice of 
forum by the parties to the litigation; and (9) that there was 
no prejudice to Aetna in denying the motion. (R. 163-165). 
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Generally, a trial court's findings and conclusions are 
presumed to be correct. Kohler v. Gardner City, 639 P.2d 162 
(Utah 1981). Moreover/ a trial court's determination/ properly 
entered under Rule 19, will not be disturbed absent an abuse of 
discretion. Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 944 
(Utah App. 1989). Here, Judge Murphy, after reviewing the 
memoranda of the parties and hearing oral argument/ carefully 
considered and entered his reasons for denying Aetna's motion, 
consistent with requirements recently laid down in Seftel, 
supra. 
The primary issue in this litigation is whether the losses 
Home sustained as a result of Larry Glad's dishonest conduct 
19 
are covered by Aetna's Bond. Aetna's assertion that some 
other person or entity is a necessary party for determination 
of that issue is inherently incredible. Its argument 
apparently is that/ absent the presence of F&D as a party/ 
neither the Trial Court nor this Court is able to read and 
19
 In its effort to convince this Court that F&D was the one 
obligated to indemnify Home/ Aetna subtly rewords Rider No. 618 
(ir 4) to the F&D Bond (R. 3431)/ when it asserts that F&D, 
after termination of its bond, would be liable for "only those 
insurable events 'discovered before the time such termination 
. . . becomes effective'" Aetna Brief/ p. 76-77 (emphasis 
added). Aetna has substituted the words "insurable events" for 
"loss sustained." Home/ on termination of the F&D Bond# had no 
"loss sustained" which it could have "discovered" under the 
terms of F&D's Bond. 
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interpret the written agreement between Aetna and Home 
Savings. To the extent reference to the F&D Bond may have been 
necessary, a copy was before the Court. Adding F&D as a party, 
however, would not have helped resolve the question of whether 
or to what extent Aetna's Bond provides coverage. 
In sharp contrast to Judge Murphy's detailed findings, 
Aetna, in asserting error, fails to articulate any specific 
reason as to why F&D must be a party to this action, other than 
20 perhaps to share with it liability for Home's losses. 
Indeed, Aetna's only authority, Continental Insurance Co. v. 
Morgan, Olmstead, Kennedy & Gardner, Inc., 148 Cal.Rptr. 57 
(Cal. App. 1978), is on the topic of Aetna sharing liability 
for defense costs. Morgan, Olmstead, however, had nothing to 
do with who or what are indispensable parties to an action. In 
that case, the insured sought recovery of defense costs 
incurred in defending a claim, the defense of which arguably 
was within the terms of either of two bonds. The insured chose 
2 0
 Even on this argument, Aetna's position is contradictory 
and inconsistent. At several points, Aetna asserts that F&D 
was an indispensable party because, had F&D been a party, it 
could have "shared" liability. Aetna Brief, pp. 76, 78. Yet, 
at page 77 of its Brief, Aetna states, "it was these contrary 
positions which required joinder of F&D as a party, as well as 
the fact the bv the express terms of the bonds only one or the 
other but not both of the insurers could be liable for the 
losses." (Emphasis added). 
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to make the claim against both carriers. Accordingly, there 
was no issue regarding indispensability of a non-party. 
The purpose of Rule 19 is to guard against the entry of 
judgments that might prejudice the rights of non-parties in 
their absence. Sanpete County Water Conservancy District v. 
Price River Water Users Association, 652 P.2d 1302, 1306 (Utah 
1982). Home's lawsuit, by naming only Aetna, could not 
prejudice F&D's rights. If Home picked the wrong insurer to 
sue, it was the one who stood to lose. Indeed, as the Trial 
Court explained, Home was the only party who could possibly 
suffer prejudice by F&D's nonjoinder. (R. 143, 144). 
Finally, had Aetna, based on its mistaken interpretation of 
coverage under its Bond, wanted F&D in the action to share 
liability, it could have attempted to bring F&D in as a 
third-party defendant under Utah R. Civ. P. 14(a). But it did 
not do so. In short, neither Aetna nor F&D was prejudiced by 
the Court's denial of Aetna's motion to dismiss. The Court's 
ruling should be affirmed. 
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POINT VII. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED AETNA'S 
BELATED REQUEST TO "OFFSET- HOME SAVINGS-
JUDGMENT. 
Aetna contends the "trial court should have reduced the 
losses on the principal of the AFCO investor loans by 
$237,760.77 in calculating its judgment,M (Aetna Brief, Point 
VII, p. 82). Aetna's contention is based on an erroneous and 
unsupportable assumption that certain sums received by Home 
Savings factually offset its losses. In appealing this issue, 
however, Aetna wholly ignores the Court's rationale for 
rejecting it in the first place: that Aetna's argument required 
that the Court usurp the jury's role and act as a fact-finder. 
Aetna first offered up its "offset" theory well after 
trial, and then only after the Trial Court ruled that Judgment 
would be entered in Home's favor. (Memorandum Decision, R. 
2058; reserving ruling on the amount of the judgment to be 
entered). Aetna never presented its "offset" argument to the 
jury. The parties, in the Pretrial Order, did not reserve this 
issue for determination by the Court after trial. (Pretrial 
Order, R. 719, 734-5). Home objected to Aetna's untimely 
submission of this claim and disputed the factual premise 
underlying Aetna's unfounded assertions and the invidious 
connotation that Aetna ascribed to Home's conduct. (R. 2103, 
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2126-7, R. 2282, 2283-2290; R. 3278.51-.60).21 Rejecting 
Aetna's belated argument, the Trial Court held: 
In order to allow the reductions the court 
would have to become a fact finder. 
Defendant itself has indicated at least four 
factual predicates to the proposed 
reduction. (April 8, 1988, Memorandum 
Regarding Attorney's Fees, and Calculation 
of Damages, pp. 7-8). While there may be 
evidence supporting such alleged facts, 
there has been no fact finding and plaintiff 
did not waive its right to a jury trial on 
these factual questions. 
(Minute Entry, R. 2397, 2398)(emphasis added). The Court 
correctly held that Home Savings had a right to have the 
factual issue of "offset" submitted to a jury. UTAH CONST. 
Art. 1, Sec. 10; Utah Code Ann. § 78-21-2 (1987)(as enacted 
1951); International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor 
and Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418, 421 (Utah 1981). 
Consequently, it properly refused to consider Aetna's belated 
plea, where Aetna had neglected to put the issue before the 
jury. For the same reason, this Court should decline to 
consider Aetna's factually intensive appeal. Franklin 
Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 
(Utah 1983). 
2 1
 Home strenuously disputes Aetna's factual assertions and 
its characterization of the $237,760.77 as a "benefit." 
Rather, the $237,760.77 which Home received was applied to 
satisfy obligations which, had they not been satisfied, would 
have resulted in additional loss. R. 2282-2290; R. 
3278.51-.54. 
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POINT VIII. 
THE JUDGMENT PROPERLY INCLUDES $190,647.31 
IN ATTORNEYS FEES THAT HOME SAVINGS PAID TO 
THE ARMITAGE PLAINTIFFS. 
The parties, following trial, submitted to the Court the 
issue of Home Savings' claim for attorneys fees paid to the 
Armitage plaintiffs, (R. 2217, 2226-2230, 2291-2299). 
Dissatisfied with Judge Murphy's ruling (Minute Entry, R. 
2397-2402), Aetna asks this Court to excise $190,647.31 from 
the Judgment. (Judgment, R. 2854). 
Home sustained a loss of $190,647.31 as a consequence of 
Judge Kane's Order awarding $381,294.62 in attorneys fees to 
the plaintiffs in the Armitaae litigation. Order Awarding 
Attorneys Fees (R. 2800-2818). Kane based the award on the 
Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) and, 
alternatively, on the Utah Securities Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-22(6)(1953). Home appealed the Armitage judgment. 
Thereafter, the Armitage plaintiffs agreed to accept half the 
attorneys fees they had been awarded, i.e., $190,647.31. It 
was this sum that Home paid. 
Judge Murphy, having considered the very same arguments 
Aetna now advances (R. 2214, 2226-2230), found that Home's 
loss, in the sum of $190,647.31, resulted from Larry Glad's 
dishonest conduct and held it was covered by Aetna's Bond. 
(Minute Entry, R. 2397, 2399). Aetna now asks this Court to 
substitute its view of the facts for Judge Murphy's. Aetna, in 
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Point VIII-A of its Brief, argues, in inverse order: (1) that 
Elaine Reese, not Larry Glad, caused the loss; (2) that its 
Bond covers only malum in se offenses; and (3) that the trading 
exclusion, Rider 6030a, excludes coverage. 
A. AETNA IGNORES EVIDENCE THAT TIES THE $190,647.31 LOSS 
TO LARRY GLAD. 
Aetna asserts that this loss Mwas caused by Home Savings* 
loan officer, Elaine Reese," and concludes that, "thus, any 
violation of the truth-in-lending statute was not a loss caused 
by the conduct of Larry Glad." (Brief, p. 85; R. 2214, 2229). 
To this, the Trial Court stated simply, "defendant's argument 
disregards the evidence of Glad's dishonest participation in 
the back-dating of loan documents." (Minute Entry, R. 2397, 
2399) . 
Findings of fact by a Court shall not be set aside "unless 
clearly erroneous." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). In this instance, 
ample evidence exists in the record to support the Trial 
Court's finding. It is true that Elaine Reese backdated loan 
documents. Aetna, however, conveniently overlooks Reese's 
testimony that she backdated loan documents a£ Larry Glad's 
direction: 
The next time I typed up documents again, I 
typed it with this correct date, and Larry 
Glad came in and instructed me that their 
agreement was that all the documents were to 
be backdated, not iust that one. And I did 
not confirm that with Bill Cox. I assumed 
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i t was that way. (R. 2913.112, l i n e s 13 -
1 7 ) . 
* * * * * 
He [Gladl said I had misunderstood and that 
the intention was that all of them were to 
be backdated. (R. 2913.113, lines 7 - 8 ) . 
* * * * * 
Like I said, I did not verify that with 
Bill. I iust took Larry's word for it and 
proceeded that way. (R. 2913.113, lines 10 
- 12). 
B. THE AETNA BOND DOES NOT LIMIT COVERAGE TO "MALUM IN 
SE" OFFENSES. 
Aetna, at pages 84-85 of its Brief, makes the incredible 
statement that its Bond covers only "malum in se" conduct. 
Aetna's argument, apparently, is that inasmuch as civil 
liability can be imposed under 15 U.S.C. § 1631 g£ seq. absent 
any finding of Hevil intent," then such civil liability 
necessarily could not produce a loss covered under the Aetna 
Bond. However, the common law classification of criminal 
offenses is not incorporated into the Aetna Bond. The criminal 
law malum in se/malum prohibitum distinction simply has nothing 
to do with whether a loss sustained by an insured is covered 
under the Bond. Contrary to Aetna's assertion, an employee's 
conduct need not be criminal to constitute "dishonesty" as 
defined by the Bond. Midland Bank & Trust Co. v. Fidelity & 
Deposit Co. of Maryland, 442 F.Supp. 960, 971 (D.N.J. 1977); 
Boston Securities v. United Bonding Co.. 309 F.Supp. 1270, 1271 
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(E.D. Mo. 1970), affirmed 441 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1971). 
Rather, the test is whether loss results directly from the 
dishonest or fraudulent act of an employee. See Aetna Bond, 
Rider 6041. The pervasive nature of Glad's dishonesty, 
including his instruction to Reese to backdate loans, supports 
the Trial Court's ruling that the loss Home sustained was 
covered by Aetna's Bond. 
C. THE TRADING EXCLUSION RIDER DOES NOT AVOID AETNA'S 
OBLIGATION TO INDEMNIFY HOME SAVINGS. 
For the reasons set forth in Point IV, supra, Aetna cannot 
use the trading exclusion rider to avoid coverage. 
Furthermore, because Judge Kane premised his award of attorneys 
fees on the federal Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1640(a)(3), as well as on Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(1)(b), a 
separate basis existed for the award of fees completely apart 
from any "securities" statute. (Minute Entry, R. 2397, 2399). 
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POINT IX. 
THE TRIAL COURT, PURSUANT TO STIPULATION OF 
THE PARTIES, PROPERLY AWARDED HOME SAVINGS 
ITS REASONABLE ATTORNEYS FEES INCURRED IN 
DEFENDING IN THE ARMITAGE LITIGATION. 
In accordance with a Stipulation entered into by the 
parties (R. 2850-2853), the Trial Court included in the 
Judgment $437,500 as reasonable attorneys fees and costs 
incurred and paid by Home Savings in defending itself in the 
Armitage litigation. (Judgment, R. 2854-2857). Aetna asks 
this Court to delete these fees from the Judgment or, 
alternatively, to direct the Trial Court to slash the award to 
$62,500.00. Appellant's Brief, p. 88. In making this request, 
Aetna seeks to circumvent the very Stipulation it voluntarily 
entered into after being unable or unwilling to controvert the 
evidence and law regarding attorneys fees which Home submitted. 
The Trial Court awarded Home Savings $437,500 under 
Agreement C of the Aetna Bond. Agreement C provides that Aetna: 
. . . will indemnify the Insured against 
court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees 
incurred and paid by the Insured in 
defending any suit or legal proceeding 
brought against the Insured to enforce the 
Insured's liability or alleged liability on 
account of any loss, claim or damage which, 
if established against the Insured, would 
constitute a valid and collectible loss 
sustained by the Insured under the terms of 
the Bond. * * * 
Going into trial, both parties understood that Home's 
entitlement to attorneys fees under Agreement C hinged on 
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whether the jury would find that Home's primary losses, caused 
by avoidance of the AFCO-investor trust deeds, resulted from 
the dishonesty of Larry Glad; i.e., whether the underlying 
losses constituted Ma valid and collectible loss sustained by 
the Insured under the terms of the Bond." Both parties 
consequently agreed, should the jury find the underlying losses 
to have been caused by Glad's dishonest conduct, then the issue 
of Home's claim for reasonable attorneys fees under Agreement C 
would be determined by the Trial Court. (Stipulated Pretrial 
Order, R. 719, 734-5). 
Following the Trial Court's post-trial decision that 
Judgment would be entered in Home's favor (Memorandum Decision, 
R. 2058 - 2081), Aetna argued for the first time that Home 
could recover only the attorneys fees expended in defending 
against "covered" claims. (R. 2214, 2230-2233). Aetna baldly 
asserted that this amount would equal 1/7 of the attorneys fees 
expended by Home in defending the Armitaoe lawsuit, reasoning 
that of the seven bases on which Home was found liable, only 
"fraud" is covered under its Bond. (See R. 2214, 2230-2234). 
Judge Murphy rejected Aetna's "arbitrary one-seventh 
allocation theory," as he termed it, because: (1) it 
incorrectly assumes that only loss caused by "fraud" is covered 
by the Aetna Bond; (2) it incorrectly assumes that each claim 
required an equal expenditure of time and costs; and (3) it 
incorrectly assumes that any particular expenditure of time and 
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costs benefitted only one claim, and that claims defended in 
Armitaae were unrelated, independent and without overlap. 
(Minute Entry, R. 2397, 3000). See also Judge Kane's Order 
Awarding Attorneys Fees (holding, in connection with the 
Armitaae plaintiffs* application for attorneys fees, that, "In 
the Home Savings Litigation, the work on unsuccessful claims 
generally is not separable from work on successful claims.") 
(R. 2800, 2804). Aetna's argument also is factually incorrect 
because Home actually defended against 20 claims, not the seven 
Aetna assumes. (Order, R. 2800, 2801, 2816). Furthermore, 
Aetna advanced its one-seventh apportionment argument in an 
evidentiary vacuum: the records of fees paid by Home in the 
Armitaae litigation and the attorneys' time records were not 
then before the Court. (See Minute Entry, R. 2397, 2399-2401). 
Although the Trial Court rejected Aetna's one-seventh 
argument, it reserved ruling finally on fees claimed under 
Agreement C, including the issue of apportionment, and directed 
the parties to resubmit the issue once a record was developed. 
(Minute Entry, R. 2397, 2399-2401). Thereafter, Home moved for 
partial summary judgment and scheduled hearings on the issue of 
attorneys fees under Agreement C. (R. 3279-3280, 2439-2441, 
2823-2827). Home claimed that Agreement C entitled it to 
$474,170.57 (R. 2653, 2666), based on affidavits, attorneys 
time records, and other supporting documents filed in support 
of its motion (R. 2442-2652, 2686-2822, 3282-3365). Most 
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importantly, Home briefed, in detail, the legal argument on 
apportionment, and demonstrated that apportionment would not be 
proper on the basis of the evidentiary record now before the 
Court. (R. 2653, 2673-2684). 
In response, Aetna neither addressed the evidentiary record 
nor briefed the issue of apportionment. It did not file 
counter-affidavits. Simply put, Aetna did not contest Home's 
claim for $474,170.57 in fees. Instead, Aetna stipulated that 
Home's entitlement to fees under Agreement C would be $437,500, 
provided the Appeals Court upheld the Trial Court's judgment 
that the underlying losses were covered by the Bond. Aetna, by 
its Stipulation "waiverdl all arguments, claims and issues on 
appeal that relate to the reasonable amount of attorneys' fees 
and court costs under General Agreement C of the Aetna Bond." 
(Stipulation, R. 2850-2853). Having presented no evidence to 
contradict Home's claim, having not objected when evidence of 
reasonableness of fees was placed before the Court, and having 
stipulated that the "reasonable" amount of Home's fees was 
$437,500, Aetna has not preserved for review by this Court the 
issue of "apportionment of fees." See McCorkle v. Great 
Atlantic Ins. Co., 637 P.2d 583, 586 (Okl. 1981). Aetna should 
not be permitted to renounce its Stipulation and, contrary to 
its agreement, resurrect its primitive "one-seventh 
apportionment argument" which the Court rejected. 
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Home's losses, sustained when Judge Kane avoided the 
Armitaqe plaintiffs' notes and trust deeds, are "valid and 
collectible losses" under the Bond. Consequently, Home is 
entitled to recover the $437,500 which Aetna stipulated were 
the "reasonable" fees Home incurred and paid in defending the 
Armitaqe lawsuit. 
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CONCLUSION 
No basis exists for either reversing or modifying the Trial 
Court's judgment or for remanding this case for another lengthy 
trial. 
Accordingly, Home respectfully requests that the Judgment, 
Orders and Rulings of the Trial Court be affirmed in their 
entirety. 
DATED this ^"^ day of May, 1990. 
CALLXSTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
By v — —-7 ^ ^ ^ 
Gary R. B<£we, Esq. 
By G- /£#<»<c^ yiHr&L—*-
P. Bryan Fishburn, Esq. 
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